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Summary
This thesis investigates volatility clustering (VC), scaling and dynamics in financial
time series (FTS) of asset returns and their underlying mechanism.
To give a quantitative measure on VC, we first introduce a conditional probability
distribution (CPD) of financial asset returns. We use such CPD to analyze a variety
of stock market data and show that it not only gives an intuitive and quantitative
measure of volatility clustering but also reveals an important new universal feature
of volatility in FTS: when each CPD is rescaled by its scale factor, they all collapse
into a universal curve with a power-law tail. This universality is so robust that it is
consistent for a very wide range of time durations (of returns) and across different
financial assets.
We propose a simple phenomenological model that embodies the two essential
empirical observations that returns are uncorrelated but the volatility is clustered
in real FTS. The model clearly illustrates a dynamical mechanism for the forma-
tion of volatility clustering and the emergence of power-law tails in the probability
xii
Summary xiii
distribution. Both unconditional and conditional probability distribution (CPD) of
returns generated with simulated time series give consistent results compatible to
that of real FTS. The model not only captures most of the stylized facts but also
overcomes a number of shortcomings of the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The three parameter model gives the desired
parsimony and sufficient flexibility to fit different FTS, so that it may be used as
an alternative tool for analyzing FTS and in particular as good starting point for
studying option pricing.
We next explore the impact of investor’s sentiments on asset prices by study-
ing the underlying mechanism of the dynamics of financial markets using a model
of heterogeneous agents with dynamic risk aversion (DRA). We employ a time-
dependent power utility function to model DRA of heterogeneous agents using a
constant-variance bounded random walk process. The time series generated by the
DRA model exhibits most of the empirical “stylized” facts observed in real FTS. We
show that the agent’s DRA is the main driving force that gives rise to excess price
fluctuations and that DRA provides a key mechanism for the emergence of these
stylized facts.
We finally study the general properties of financial markets from the perspective
of interacting and competing agents. We discover the general mechanism for the
transition from self-segregation to herding behaviors of the agents in an evolutionary
minority game (EMG) with probabilistic strategies based on trends. The mechanism
shows that large market impact favors self-segregation behavior, while large market
inefficiency causes herding effects. We also study network based EMG, and we
demonstrate that the dynamics and the associated phase structure depend crucially
on the structure of the underlying network: with evolution, the network system with
Summary xiv
a “near” critical dynamics evolves to the highest level of global coordination among
its agents, leading to the best performance.
All these results may give some new insight in understanding the scaling, clus-
tering and dynamics of volatility in FTS and their underlying mechanism of the
financial market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A systematic study of financial time series (FTS) started in the early 1960s,
marked by the seminal work of Mandelbrot [124] and Fama [61]. Since then, some
important characteristics in the FTS of asset returns have been accumulated, such
as, excess kurtosis (or fat-tails), volatility clustering (VC), asymmetry, and leverage
effects. Among these “stylized” facts, excess volatility and its associated clustering
have been most widely studied due to their importance in theory and application
of financial study. However, due to the inherent complexity, there are still quite a
number of unsolved problems. First, although volatility clustering has been widely
studied, there has not been a well accepted quantitative measure for it; second,
a model that can explain and reproduce all the key stylized facts is still lacking;
third, the mechanism for the emergence of these stylized facts, originated from the
investors’ collective behavior, remains a “myth”; fourth, the general properties of
financial markets, viewed from the perspective of a system of competing and evolving
agents, have not been identified. We will explore these problems in sequence in this
thesis. It is worth noting that all these problems are interrelated and the central
focus is the dynamics of volatility fluctuations.
1
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In the next section, we will discuss volatility clustering and its measure. Section
2 describes how to model volatility clustering. Section 3 investigates the underlying
mechanism for the emergence of volatility clustering and introduces heterogeneous
and dynamic risk aversion to model volatility clustering with an agent-based model.
In section 4, we summarize the study of the financial market from the viewpoint of
interactive game and reveal some key general properties of the market in the context
of an evolutionary minority game. The last section gives an overall summary and
the outline of this thesis.
1.1 Volatility Clustering
1.1.1 Volatility clustering and its characteristics
Volatility clustering describes volatility autocorrelation. Its empirical observation
was first made by Mandelbrot [124] in the early 1960s: that large (small) financial
asset returns (positive or negative) have a tendency to be followed by large (small)
returns of either sign. Unlike othermarginal (or unconditional) statistical properties,
volatility clustering describes a conditional temporal dependence of the volatility,
which embodies essential information on the dynamics of financial time series (FTS).
Since it is first observed, volatility clustering is found to be ubiquitous in the FTS of
asset returns from different markets, for different assets and in different time periods.
It is also observed that the strength of volatility clustering in FTS strongly depends
on (among other variables) the sampling frequency of the time series: the higher
the frequency, the stronger the clustering. Thus it is essential to have a quantitative
measure of volatility clustering in order to characterize different financial assets
in different markets and on different time scales. However, such direct (and well
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accepted) measure has not been reported. Thus the first problem we address in the
thesis will be: how to quantify the key concept of volatility clustering and construct
a direct and quantitative measure for it.
1.1.2 Direct measure of volatility clustering
A direct measure of volatility clustering is a necessity for a quantitative analysis of
volatility dynamics in FTS. We introduce a conditional probability measure (CPM)
of financial asset return distribution as a direct measure on VC. Our CPM is a
conditional probability distribution (CPD), P (r|rp;T ) of the asset return r(T ) in
the current time interval T , given the return rp(T ) in the previous time interval of
the same length. Here the parameter T is the time duration on which the returns
are measured. The CPD, P (r|rp;T ), can be estimated by, first grouping the data
into different bins according to the value of rp(T ) and then using the data in each
bin to compute the probability distribution of return r(T ).
1.1.3 Universal curve of volatility clustering
We use the CPD to analyze a variety of stock market data and find that P (r|rp),
when scaled by a scale factor w(r|rp), collapse to a universal curve P (r˜ = r/w(r|rp))
with a power law tail (w(r|rp) is the standard deviation of the CPD). The linear
dependence of w(r|rp) on rp, at large rp, is a direct measure of VC. This universal
feature is valid not only for a very wide range of time intervals of the returns, but
also for different asset series, suggesting that the CPD may serve as another measure
characterizing volatility in FTS.
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1.2.1 Modeling volatility clustering with GARCH model
Engle’s Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model and its gen-
eralization GARCH/EGARCH model are the most well-known models of volatility
clustering [53, 18, 135] and they are most widely studied and applied in practice.
Despite the tremendous success, these models have some undesirable characteris-
tics. First, it is observed that a GARCH model correctly specified for one frequency
of data will be misspecified for data with different time scales [56]. Second, these
(GARCH/EGARCH) models, at their best, describe FTS with relative low kurtosis
1, high first-order autocorrelation function (ACF) and fast decaying of higher order
ACF of squared (or absolute-valued) return [123]. However in real FTS, the opposite
is generally true: i.e., the kurtosis is high, first-order ACF is low and the higher-order
ACF decays very slowly. Third, while the kurtosis in real FTS is a monotonic de-
creasing function of (aggregate) time lag, the kurtosis given by GARCH (1,1) model
first increases with the time lag, reaches its maximum and then decreases [36]. Thus,
when it comes to consistently characterizing all the empirical observations, search
for a new model that can reproduce all the key stylized facts is necessary.
1.2.2 A phenomenological volatility clustering model
We introduce a phenomenological model to generate and explain the emergence of
volatility clustering which is manifested by the emergence of power-law fat-tails in
both its unconditional and conditional return distributions. The model is developed
from the model introduced by Chen and Jayaprakash [32]. The logarithm return
1kurtosis is a measure of the “peakedness” of the probability distribution of a real-valued random
variable, measuring how far away the distribution is from a Gaussian distribution. See Chapter 2
for details
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X(t) of the model satisfies the discrete evolution equation given byX(t+1) = X(t)+
δ(t)z(t), where z(t) ∼ N(0, 1) is an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Gaussian noise, and δ(t) = δ0γ
n(t) is a stochastic random volatility variable which is
governed by a non-negative random integer variable n(t). Here δ0 is the minimum
value of δ(t). The dynamics of n(t) evolves, independent of change ofX(t), according
to the probabilities for n to increase or decrease by unity: Pr(n→ n + 1) = p and
Pr(n→ n− 1) = 1− p (p < 0.5).
The model, as it turns out, is able to generate time series for different time scales
and for a wide range of strengths of volatility clustering; it can thus be used to fit
different volatility clustering in different market data.
1.2.3 Property of the phenomenological model
In the steady-state, the probability distribution of n is given by P (n) = (1 −
e−λ)e−λn ∼ λe−λn, where λ = ln((1 − p)/p). The distribution of δ(t) is then given
by a power-law, P (δ) ∼ δ−λ/ lnγ−1. Given that P (δ) is a power law, it can be
shown that there is also a power law tail in the probability distribution of the return
r = X(t+T )−X(t) over a given time period T . We show analytically that the CPD
exhibits scaling collapse and scale-invariant behavior with a power law tail with an
exponent of −4 if we choose p = 1/(1 + γ2). We study this model numerically and
find that many features of the CPD exhibited by the real data including the power
laws and the scaling are reproduced. The re-scaling factor required for data collapse
is simply proportional to rp from our analysis, as we have observed from the real
data and from numerical simulations of model when rp is not too small.
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The model, when applied with multi-step sampling (for example, sampling daily
price series with multiple steps), can reproduce the high kurtosis and the time
duration dependence of excess volatility ubiquitously observed in real FTS. With
the time scale parameter, δ0, the model can fit with any time scales of real FTS,
making it easy to use in practice.
1.3 Agent-Based Modeling of Volatility Cluster-
ing
1.3.1 What is the underlying mechanism of volatility clus-
tering?
Although there have been considerable efforts in exploring statistical models of
volatility clustering, the underlying economic causality remains very much an un-
solved puzzle [19]. There is a long-established literature which links asset price
volatility to trading volume, however it has not been very clear whether changes
in trading volume are the causes of volatility changes, or whether both are caused
by other common unobserved (i.e. latent) variables of which random variable of
news flows are generally conjectured. The effort to attribute volatility clustering
to the underlying news flows process has achieved only limited success (see, e.g.,
Mitchell and Mulherin [133], Haugen, Talmor, and Torous [83]; and Jones, Lam-
ont, and Lumsdaine [94]). Some other studies on the other hand have reported
the different effects of imperfect and symmetric information on volatility in markets
[164, 155, 95]. Still some other researchers tried to explain volatility clustering as a
by-product of a price formation process with disperse but correlated beliefs across
risk-averse agents (see e.g., for example, Harris and Raviv [82], Shalen [147], Kurz
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and Motolese [111], and Brock and Lebaron [23]). Although investment sentiment
has been an important issue in behavioral finance [151], the literature is scarce on
work in understanding price impacts (represented as the excess price fluctuation
and in particular volatility clustering) of investor’s changing risk attitudes. To be
specific, the key question we shall examine is: whether such diverse and dynamic
risk attitudes (not beliefs) of market agents can give rise to volatility clustering. We
attempt to explore such a problem in this thesis.
1.3.2 Consumption-based asset pricing with agent-based mod-
eling
It is well known (from the first principle of consumption-based asset pricing) that
the price of a risky asset is equal to the expectation of discounted future payoff
(or cash flow) of the risky asset, i.e. pt = Et(mSt+1) [38], where m is a subjective
stochastic discount factor, and St+1 the payoff of the risky asset at next time step.
Although the form of the price equation seems to be very simple, yet it is very dif-
ficult to further “simplify” it into an explicit function of its independent variables.
The first major difficulty is that the future payoff is unknown at current time and
can not be “derived” deductively, but can only be guessed subjectively and induc-
tively [6]. This problem (of the subjective estimation of future payoff for the risky
asset) is nevertheless usually circumvented by treating it as a “technical” problem
of forecasting of future payoff generated by the risky asset. The second difficulty
is that the price involves a subjective stochastic discount factor which is linked to
investors’ risk attitude. It is believed that most rational investors have risk aversion
described by a concave and strictly increasing utility function, for example, a power
utility (U(c, γ) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ , here c and γ are the wealth consumption and the risk
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aversion index of an investor, respectively). In principle it seems easy to obtain a
price function by optimizing the total utility of the investors defined over the cur-
rent time step and the next time step [38]. However there is a difficult “technical”
problem: the expectation admits no exact analytical solution of the price equation
for the power utility function with a normally distributed estimation error.
1.3.3 Agent-based model with heterogeneous and dynamic
risk aversion
We propose a multiagent based model of heterogeneous agents with dynamic risk
aversion (DRA). We apply the popular power utility function with decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion (DARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) introduced
by Arrow and Pratt [4, 141] to derive an approximated price equation and incorpo-
rate investor’s DRA into the model. We first derive an approximated price equation
with an assumption of normal distribution of agents’ estimation errors. The key
technique is to approximate a Gaussian integral with a summation of the roots of
Hermite polynomials. The formulas of demand and price functions turn out to be
very simple and intuitive: they are expressed as functions of three “independent”
variables: investor’s subjective estimate of future payoff (or return), the variance
of their estimation errors, and investor’s risk aversion index (attitude). We then
model the time-varying risk aversion of each agent by a simple bounded random
walk process with a constant variance δ2 and incorporate it into the model to obtain
a price function with a dynamic risk aversion. This enables us to directly analyze
the price impacts of dynamic risk averse and heterogeneous agents.
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1.3.4 Dynamic risk aversion: a key factor of volatility clus-
tering
Our analytical and numerical results show that dynamic risk aversion can be directly
linked to the excess price fluctuation and volatility clustering. This establishes a
direct impact of investor’s dynamic risk-averse attitudes on price. The time series
generated by the model exhibits most of the statistical stylized facts, particularly
the excess price fluctuations (corresponding to fat-tails in return distribution) and
volatility clustering in various strengths depending on the value of δ. In this regard
our model is both parsimonious (as it has only one adjustable parameter δ to control
the strength of volatility clustering) and practical (as it can generate simulation
series with various excess volatilities and volatility clustering with various strengths).
In addition, we test the price impacts on a few other baseline multi-agent models
[6, 115] with DRA agents, in particular, on the well-known Santa Fe Institute market
model [6], and we observed similar results. This means that the price impact due to
DRA of heterogeneous agents we introduced here does not depend on the structure
of the particular baseline model used. The degree of excess volatility is essentially
controlled by the parameter δ and DRA is the key mechanism that gives rise to
excess price fluctuations and associated volatility clustering. We suggest that the
degree of volatility clustering (originated from DRA agents), δ, can be used as a
key market parameter, in conjunction with the average return r and the average
volatility σ0, to characterize the market data.
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Based Models —Minority Game
Now comes our last problem: what is the most general statistical property of the
financial market when looked at from the perspective of a game of interacting and
competing agents? Recently there have been growing interests in studying financial
market from the perspective of a game of competing agents, e.g., minority game
(MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang [30] (see a collection of publications at:
http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/). Here we consider generic behavior of agents
in an evolutionary minority game (EMG) and study the mechanism for such behavior
with possible interpretation in the context of financial markets (market impact and
market inefficiency). The aim is to gain better understanding of investors’ behavior,
such as herding, clustering of strategies, trend-following and segregation, in financial
markets. This can be done through modeling of evolution mechanism and studying
its impact on investor’s behavior in a long run. The evolution mechanism can
be studied from a few different perspectives; here we focus on two key statistics
of interrelated behaviors between the investors and the market: the population
distribution of investors’ strategy and the market efficiency in terms of how efficient
the limited resources are distributed among investors. How investors make their
decision is the key here, which may be influenced by the performance history of
their own strategies or by other agents’ strategies. Here we give separate studies on
both: agent-market interactive MG and agent-agent interactive MG.
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1.4.1 Population distribution of agents’ probabilistic trend-
based strategies in EMG
An important question in the study of the agent-based models is how evolution
changes the behavior of the agents whose adaptive strategies are based upon the
history of the market. In the context of a simple evolutionary minority game (EMG)
where agents adopt probabilistic trend-based strategies, Johnson et al. found that
the agents universally self-segregate into two opposing extreme groups [93]. Hod
and Nakar, on the other hand, claimed that a clustering of cautious agents emerges
in a “tough environment” where the penalty for losing is greater than the reward
for winning [86, 134]. It is natural to ask: what is the mechanism for the phase-
transition between these two phases and how it depends on the system parameters?
A complete understanding of the mechanism for the transition from segregation to
herding requires a detailed statistical mechanical analysis of the EMG by exploring
the whole phase space relating to the parameter N , R, and d. Here N is the number
of the agents, R the reward-to-fine ratio for winning and losing, and d (< 0) is the
“bankruptcy” threshold. In this thesis, we give a detailed statistical mechanical
analysis of the population distribution of the agents in the EMG using an adiabatic
approximation, in which the short term fluctuations of the market inefficiencies
(arbitrage opportunities) are integrated out to obtain an equation for the steady
state distribution of the agents [33].
We have performed extensive simulations of the EMG for a wide range of the values
of the parameters, N ,R, and d. Our numerical results show that the transition from
segregation to clustering is generic for R < 1. The transition depends on all three
parameters, N , R, and d. Our results can be summarized by the general expression
1.4 Evolution of Strategies in a Stylized Agent Based Models —Minority
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where A is a constant of the order one. Alternatively one might view the transition
by varying d with fixed N and R. As |d| increases the system changes from clustering
to segregation. The critical value is given by |d| = A(1− R)√N .
Thus, we discover and formalize the general mechanism for the transition of agents
from self-segregation (into opposing groups) to clustering (towards cautious behav-
ior) in an evolutionary Minority Game (EMG). The mechanism shows that large
market impact favors “extreme” players who choose fixed strategies (analogous to
fundamentalists), while large market inefficiency favors “cautious” players (analo-
gous to noise traders) who switch strategy frequently. This helps to deepen our
understanding of the fundamental behavior of an evolving population of agents and
the phase-transition in population distribution.
1.4.2 Dynamics and phase structure of EMG with adaptive
and deterministic strategies
We have also studied the EMG [168] where agents use deterministic and adaptive
strategies as were used in the original MG [30]. In this study each agent evolves
individually whenever his wealth reaches a specified bankruptcy level, in contrast to
the evolutionary schemes used in the previous works [118]. Based on our statistical
analysis, we show that the simple evolutionary scheme can result in a radical change
of the phase structure of MG. We show that evolution greatly suppresses herding
behavior, and it leads to better overall performance of the agents. The curve of σ2/N
as a function of 2M/N can be characterized by a universal curve with a very different
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phase structure from MG without evolution. Here N is the total number of agents
in the game, M is the memory size of agents and σ2 is the variance of the number of
winning agents at each round of the play. The key difference of the phase structure
between EMG and MG can be summarized as: 1) in EMG the system performance
is dramatically better than that of MG due to the effect of the evolution selection;
2) the evolution is especially effective for the cases where the system memory sizes
are small; and 3) the impact of evolution decreases as the system memory size, M ,
increases and the performance of EMG approaches that of MG for the cases when
M becomes very large.
1.4.3 EMG with agent-agent interaction
In real financial markets, the investors’ investment strategies may also depend on (to
certain extent) the strategies of other investors. Here we investigate the dynamics
of network minority games (NMG) in which each agent bases their strategies on the
strategies of a few other (K) agents [169]. We investigate the dynamics of NMG
on three generic networks: Kauffman’s NK networks (Kauffman nets) [99], growing
directed networks (GDNets), and growing directed networks with a small fraction
of link reversals (GDRNets) [170]. We show that the dynamics and the associated
phase structure of the game depend crucially on the structure of the underlying
network. The dynamics on GDNets is very stable for all values of the connection
number K, in contrast to the dynamics on Kauffman’s NK networks, which becomes
chaotic whenK > Kc = 2. The dynamics of GDRNets, on the other hand, exhibits
behaviors that are as between GDNets and Kaufman nets, particularly for large
K. For Kauffman nets with K > 3, the evolutionary scheme has no effect on the
dynamics (it remains chaotic) and the performance of the MG resembles that of a
random choice game (RCG).
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The CPD we introduced gives a direct and quantitative measure of volatility
clustering by which an universal feature is uncovered in real FTS: when P (r|rp;T )
is rescaled by a scale factor w(rp), it collapses to a universal curve exhibiting a
power-law tail with an exponent of −4. The CPD is intuitive, quantitative and easy
to compute. It is a useful tool for characterizing the strength of volatility clustering.
Our phenomenological model captures the key feature of gradual change of volatil-
ity, and it is able to reproduce most of the stylized facts in real FTS, such as fat-tails,
volatility clustering and slow-decaying ACF. Both statistical analysis and numerical
simulation from the model show that the CPDs exhibit scaling collapse and scale-
invariant behavior with a power law tail, consistent with real FTS. In addition, the
kurtosis of the model is a monotonic decreasing function of time lag, compatible
with real FTS. Furthermore, the model is able to generate time series for different
time scales and for a wide range of strengths of volatility clustering so that it can
be used to fit different market data; therefore it can be potentially used for option
pricing.
The DRA we introduced captures the key behavioral feature of heterogeneous
agents which is responsible for the emergence of excess volatility and the associ-
ated clustering. As a result, a simple agent-based model with DRA can explain
and reproduce most of the key stylized facts exhibited in real FTS. This provides
new insights into the dynamics of asset price fluctuations governed by investors’
fluctuating sentiments.
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We explore how evolution changes agents’ behavior in minority games. We dis-
cover and formulate the general mechanism for the phase-transition exhibited in the
population distribution of competing and evolving agents with probabilistic trend-
based strategies in an EMG. The mechanism shows that large market impact favors
“extreme” players who choose fixed strategies (analogous to fundamentalists), while
large market inefficiency favors “cautious” players (analogous to noise traders) who
switch strategy frequently. We give a statistical analysis of the dynamics and the
phase structure of EMG and show that a simple evolutionary scheme can result in a
radical change of the phase structure of MG with adaptive and deterministic strate-
gies, especially in the cases where the memory sizes of the system are small. We
investigate the dynamics of NMG on three generic networks and show that the
dynamics and the associated phase structure of the game depend crucially on the
structure of the underlying network and evolution makes radical improvement on
market efficiency in general.
All these results from our study help us get better understanding of the dynamics
of financial market characterized by stylized facts exhibited in FTS, such as scaling
and clustering of volatility.
The organization of the thesis is as follows. The next chapter gives a review
on the fundamental features of assets and recent developments on analyzing and
modeling of financial time series. Chapter 3 describes a direct and quantitative
measure of volatility clustering which is used to analyze real FTS and reveals a new
universal property of real FTS. Chapter 4 studies time series modeling of financial
assets with two major focuses: review study of ARCH/GARCH types of models
and introduces a new stochastic volatility model that can be used to explain and
reproduce the “stylized facts” observed in real FTS. Chapter 5 explores the price
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impacts of time varying risk aversion attitudes of heterogeneous agents using an
agent-based market model. Chapter 6 studies the mechanism and the impact of
evolution of strategies in agent based models — minority game (MG), which may
have possible interpretation in the context of financial markets (market impact and
market inefficiency). Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and contributions of this
dissertation and future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews some of the most fundamental features of financial assets,
and recent development in analyzing and modeling of financial assets. Our primary
focuses are on analyzing and modeling of essential features of financial asset returns;
these include the key stylized facts - excessive and clustered volatility, scaling with
respect to time, the price dynamics, and the impact of investors’ risk-aversion pref-
erences on price. Therefore, the review will concentrate on those developments that
are most relevant to our focuses. For a comprehensive treatment of theory of asset
pricing, readers are referred to the books of Duffine [50] and of Cochrane [38] and
the references cited therein. For empirical financial modeling (or financial econo-
metrics in a more general term), readers will find excellent treatment in the books
of Campbell [28] and Gourieroux [75]. For readers concerned with practical applica-
tions, the books of Hull [89] and of Hunt [90], for example, are excellent references
for theory and application of financial derivatives. For a time series approach, the
books of Hamilton [81], of Box et al [21], and of Taylor [158] provide intensive and
comprehensive treatment of modeling financial time series.
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Financial markets play a key role in the economy, society and people’s welfare, thus
they are among the most widely studied complex systems. The earliest quantitative
study of financial time series (FTS) began in the early 1900s by the pioneering
work of a French mathematician, Bachelier [8]. Financial markets and asset pricing
have been studied from a few different perspectives using theoretical, empirical,
and behavioral approaches. Theoretical (or mathematical) finance starts with some
basic assumptions, describes the system with a few state equations, and solves the
equations to obtain the (pricing) results [50, 38, 42]. In multi-period settings under
uncertainty, the theory of portfolio selection and asset pricing contains three basic
assumptions: Arbitrage, Optimality, and Equilibrium, which are the most essential
building blocks of theoretical finance. The system equations are usually expressed as
continuous-time stochastic differential equations (SDEs) which reflect both the time
evolution of the system and the future uncertainty of the asset prices. The success
of the theoretical approach has been marked with several milestones; for example,
the Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM) of Sharpe and Lintner [148, 119] in the mid
1960s and the option pricing model of Black and Scholes [15] in the 1970s are among
the most influential.
Despite its great success, the theoretical approach, in particular, the continuous-
time approach has inherent difficulty dealing with the dynamics of financial market
and the price fluctuation of financial assets. Since our primary focus in this thesis is
the dynamics related features of financial markets and asset pricing, continuous-time
approach will only be discussed where it is necessary.
Empirical finance (or financial econometrics) uses data analysis and statistical
inference methods to address economic problems with structure or descriptive mod-
eling. During the past twenty years, it has experienced a rapid development, helped
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by the increasing availability of high-frequency financial data, stimulated by in-
creasing demand for researchers with advanced econometric skills and increasing
variety of complexity of financial products. Time series analysis (TSA) is one of the
most essential tools and it has become the de facto standard method of empirical
data analysis. It directly deals with the financial asset price observation itself with-
out concerning with how the price process is generated. One of the breakthroughs
of the TSA approach is the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH)
model introduced by Engle [53] in 1982 and its extension, the generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model developed four years later
by Bollerslev [18]. We shall put significant effort in the TSA approach to study the
key dynamic features related to volatility; in particular, we will study the stochastic
and GARCH volatility as well as their dynamics and time aggregate properties in
details.
Analyzing and modeling of financial assets are the two most fundamental and
challenging problems in the theory of financial economics and in the practice of
financial forecasting. They have been among the most active research areas not
only because they are academically interesting and challenging but more because
they have great importance in practice. It is obvious that analyzing and modeling
of financial series are so closely related that some authors (e.g. Hamilton, Box and
Taylor [81, 21, 158]) treat them together in a unified framework. We address these
two issues separately (as doing so makes the thesis better structured), so that it
gives a better presentation on our efforts in exploring both new analyzing method
and new modeling approaches of FTS.
Behavioral finance tries to understand the mechanism of the financial market from
the perspective of investors’ behavior [151] and it is a relatively new effort. In this
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context, agent-based modeling is among the most promising as it provides an ideal
framework for investigating the impact on market dynamics due to the behavior of
interacting agents. As a result, it has become an indispensable tool in behavioral
computational finance1. The agent-based modeling (ABM) treats the market as a
complex system consisting of interacting investors and tries to model the asset price
as a result of the collective behavior of individual investors in response to changing
market conditions and economic macro/micro-environments. As our major focus is
on the price dynamics of volatility of financial asset returns, we shall explore the
problems in parallel along the line of TSA and the line of ABM. Therefore we only
overview those basic features that are most relevant to our research scopes.
The general properties of financial markets can be studied using the most funda-
mental market principle of balance of opposite forces of demand and supply. Along
this line of thinking, the market can be regarded as an evolutionary complex system
where agents compete with different beliefs of the market, different strategies and
conflict interests, etc. The minority game model captures this central feature and
has been proposed to study general statistical feature of the financial market [30].
This is a very different and relatively new effort in studying financial market, aiming
to obtain an understanding of the generic statistical property of the market. Al-
though it is a new effort, there have been numerous interesting results reported (see
e.g. a collection of publications at: http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/). We will
give a brief overview of this line of research, highlighting the progress, pinpointing
some important issues remain, and proposing our methods to study some of these
interesting problems.
1LeBaron [114] is a good recent survey in the field
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The chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, we give a brief overview
of the financial market and financial assets. Section 2 reviews the important charac-
teristic features of financial assets. Section 3 discusses the theory of financial asset
pricing. Section 4 examines the recent development in analyzing of FTS. Section 5
deals with agent-based modeling. Section 6 reviews the mechanism for evolution of
strategies in a stylized and prototypical market model — minority game. The last
states the conclusion that is arrived at.
2.1 Financial Markets and Financial Assets
2.1.1 Financial markets
The financial market is believed to be one of the most complex (man-made) systems
in the world; it has paramount impact on society, the economy, business and the
welfare of households. The financial market can be described from many different
perspectives and large number of books are available [129, 132, 116, 13, 48, 91, 128,
105, 101, 40, 166, 106, 72, 80, 43]. Due to the inherent timely effect of the dynamics
on investor’s investment strategy, all the financial markets are covered by more
timely media such as daily financial/business newspapers and instant online trading
information provided by the respective markets. As our focus is on the dynamics of
FTS in general, the financial market will be treated as a system of aggregation of
all its traded financial assets.
2.1.2 Financial assets
Financial assets are defined as contracts that give the owner the right to receive (or
obligation to provide) future monetary cash flows under certain conditions. There
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are four categories of financial assets. In this study we focus on the most relevant
and most widely studied category, i.e., financial asset held for trading – one that
is acquired principally for the purpose of generating a profit from short-term price
fluctuations. These trading assets include all the underlying securities such as stocks,
bonds, bank deposits, and the likes, and the derivatives such as options, futures,
and the likes. In terms of predictability, there are two kinds of assets: risk-free,
the future cash-flows being known, and risky assets, the future cash-flows being
uncertain. Unless otherwise indicated, assets refer to risky assets throughout this
thesis. The prices and transaction volumes of traded financial assets can be sampled
(recorded) in various temporal frequencies to generate FTS with different sampling
rates, which are indispensable resources for empirical study.
2.1.3 Market uncertainty and price fluctuation
One of the most fundamental questions for financial market has been: is the price
predictable? The answer to this question determines or depends on whether the
market is efficient. The early empirical findings, (that price changes follows a random
walk) combined with the theory of Paul Samuelson, published in his influential paper
“Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly” [144] in 1965, led to the
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) [62]. The EMH states that security prices always
fully reflect the available information; therefore it is not possible to exploit any
information set to predict future price changes. The theoretical debate and empirical
challenge over whether the market is efficient or not has never been conclusive,
yet more and more latest empirical evidence skew to support an inefficient market
alternative [151]. In particular, strong evidence of excess return fluctuation and
volatility clustering ubiquitously observed from empirical data present the greatest
challenge to EMH. The answer to the question of whether the market is efficient
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may also depend on what is the time horizon of focus: academia usually takes a
long time horizon and ignores the short-time price fluctuations in their study, while
practitioners commonly focus on short-time price fluctuations and takes advantage
of such short-time price fluctuations. Thus, we believe that both hypotheses may
be right in their own scopes. However, our primary interest is not to test whether
EMH is true or not, but instead to understand what is the underlying mechanism
that governs the dynamics of the price fluctuations in financial assets.
2.1.4 Key properties of FTS
Nonstationarity is of one of the most common features in most economic and
financial time series, which means, mathematically, their first and second moments
are not independent of time. With nonstationary time series, statistical inference is
no longer valid as a regression often gives a spurious estimate of positive correlation
between the two independent processes. The breakthrough to this great difficulty
was accomplished by Granger by introducing a concept of conintegration [77, 78,
54]. He defined the concept of degree of integration of a variable: if a random
variable zt can be made approximately stationary by differencing it d times, it is
called integration of order d, or I(d). In this context, the return of FTS is the first
order difference of logarithm of the price time series of I(1). This breakthrough
has “radically changed the way empirical models of macroeconomic relationships
are formulated today” 2. Fig. 2.1 plots S&P 500 stock index price and the return
(defined as the difference of logarithm of price series), which shows clearly that
the price series is non-stationary, but the return series is approximately close to a
stationary process 3. So, we will stick to use return time series in the study unless
2Advanced Information on the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel, 8th Oct, 2003, see Website:www.kva.se
3The definition of a stationary process will be given in a subsequent section
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Figure 2.1: The price and return time series of S&P 500 index
there is a need to use price series otherwise4.
Volatility of return is another central feature of financial assets, which is a measure
of price fluctuation by the relative rate at which the price of an asset moves up
and down. In practice, volatility is often expressed as a statistical measure of the
standard deviation of an asset return measured in a specified time horizon. It is
a commonly observed in empirical analysis that the volatilities for different assets
differ and this feature characterizes the riskiness of risky assets; the higher the
4Another obvious reason to use returns instead of prices in financial study is that the former
make more direct economic sense
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volatility, the riskier of the asset. It is easy to see that the volatilities measured
for the returns in different time periods will have different values for a given asset;
so a scaling is required for comparing volatilities for the returns in different time
periods. It is a common practice to scale the volatility with the square root of the
durations of the time-period5; for example, the volatility for a daily return of an
asset can be translated to an annualized volatility by multiplying it with the square
root of the number of (250 working) days in a year. Thus, a daily volatility of 1%
is scaled to an annualized volatility of 15.81%. It is easy to observe that volatility
varies over time, which is a key property of FTS. Thus the study of the dynamics
of the volatility has been one of the most important subjects of FTS and it is one
of the focuses in this thesis.
Now that the returns of FTS are usually used in the analysis, the first question
one would ask is: what are their statistical properties? The research to answer
this question has experienced a few progressive stages. The earliest assumption on
the price change, implied by the work of Bachelier [8] in 1900 is that it was an
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal distribution. However, as
we know today, the i.i.d. normality often does not confirm with the real FTS. Fama
[61] in 1965 did away with normal distribution, moving one step closer to reality. A
closer hypothesis on price change assumed by Granger and Morgenstern [76] was that
the price change is independent, but not necessarily identically distributed. As we
know today that most realistic hypothesis is that the return (can be defined as change
of the logarithm price) of FTS ought to be uncorrelated instead of independent6. We
5Note however, such a scaling makes good sense only when the returns are sequentially indepen-
dent; unfortunately the opposite is usually true in real FTS, thus it must be used with discretion
in practice
6The uncorrelated assumption is best supported by observation in empirical study of FTS, see
the ACFs analysis in Chapter 3 for evidence
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take the uncorrelated return assumption throughout this thesis.
2.2 Features of Financial Assets
2.2.1 Prices and frequency of observations
Due to frequent fluctuations, prices of financial assets are highly sensitive to the
frequency of observations (samplings). As a consequence, FTS generated, from
the same asset, by different sampling frequencies may possess different dynamics.
Most common time series in micro-financial study are sampled with daily or higher
sampling frequencies. The prices in a daily series (based on 250 business days a
year) are usually taken from the daily closure prices. The time series of a financial
asset can be generated in higher rate of sampling-frequency of time unit in minutes,
resulting in “high-frequency” data, or in full record of transactions, generating so-
called ultra high-frequency (tick-by-tick) data. The full record of transaction on
bid (buying) price, ask (selling) price, bid-ask spread (the difference), trade price
and volume, and time the trade occurs, is a very useful ultra high-frequency data
sources for understanding the price dynamics, which requires analysis using a point
process (with stochastic time) [56]. In this thesis, we focus on the dynamics of price
fluctuation in the time scale of days or minutes so we shall use only daily and high
frequency time series.
2.2.2 Price regularities
In real financial markets, several regularities have been observed in the prices fluctu-
ation, such as “calendar effect”, “January effect”, day-of-the-week effect, and hour-
of-the-day effect. While recognizing that these regularities may have some impact
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on the results of dynamical and statistical analysis of FTS, we treat them as a minor
factor and ignore them unless they have otherwise significant impact.
2.2.3 Returns and time scales
Although there are a few ways to describe a price change or return, the most com-
monly used return is defined as a discounted relative price change:
rt(∆t) ≡ St − St−∆t(1 + r)
St−∆t(1 + r)
(2.1)




r(τ)dτ ) is the reverse discount factor; here r(t) is the stochastic interest rate.
This return definition reflects both the time value and the percentage gain/loss in
a give time period, ∆t. For a time period of a day or shorter, the gain from interest
rate is negligibly smaller comparing to the volatility of the return so that it is ignored
in practice. For example, for a time period of day and a 5% annum interest rate the
gain from interest rate is 0.02% a day, but the average daily volatility is ∼ 1% for
stocks. Thus a simpler approximation form: r˜t(∆t) =
St−St−∆t
St−∆t
is usually used. In
theoretical and empirical analysis, the above return is often further approximated
by a logarithm difference of the asset prices:
Xt(∆t) ≡ log St − log St−∆t = log(1 + St − St−∆t
St−∆t
)
≈ St − St−∆t
St−∆t
= r˜t(∆t) (2.2)
provided that the time scale ∆t is not too large so that r˜t(∆t) 1. We will simply
use Xt instead of Xt(∆t) whenever there is no confusion caused by doing so and we
are aware of that the return is defined and dependent on the period, ∆t.
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This definition has two advantages: 1) the rate of return is continuous compounding
which is a convenient feature in practice; and 2) the total return aggregate from
sequential periods is a simple summation over the individual returns, which is a
very convenient feature for theoretical data analysis. Thus, we will use this return
definition in this thesis.
It is worthwhile to remember that: 1) the returns are always defined on some specific
time periods (i.g., daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly return, etc.), thus, it is necessary
to scale before they are compared, if they are defined on different time scales; and
2) the return defined here is nominal, i.e. the inflation has not been accounted for.
2.3 Financial Asset Pricing
Asset pricing theory tries to postulate how to determine the price or value of a
financial asset. The most significant breakthrough in asset pricing has been the Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe [148] and Lintner [119], which is based
on the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) introduced by von Newman and Morgenstern
[173] in 1944 and the foundation of portfolio theory developed by Markowitz [126]
in 1952. Many models for asset pricing have been proposed during the past half
century. In this thesis we follow the general framework of the consumption-based
model [38] to construct our multiagent-based model. We shall extend the framework
to study markets consisting of heterogeneous and dynamic risk-averse agents and to
study the impact of their risk aversion on the dynamics of the price fluctuations in
Chapter 5.
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2.3.1 The first principle
The ultimate goal of investment of any rational investor is to increase his total
expected utility. Since the payoff from a financial asset is in the future and therefore
uncertain, intuitively it seems reasonable to assume that the price of a financial
asset should be determined by its expected discounted future payoff (cash flows).
For a particular asset, one investor, at time step t, may expect a price to be: pt =
E(mt+1St+1), where St+1 is the asset payoff at next time step t +1, and mt+1 is the
stochastic discount factor. Since the true value of St+1 is unknown at time t, the
agents’ expected prices must be subjective and will generally be different for different
investors. Thus there will be three issues to be addressed for the determination of
the price or the value of a financial asset: 1) how to discount the future value;
2) how to estimate its future payoff; and 3) how to resolve the differences in the
subjective price estimates from different investors. Although there are many theories
in pricing asset, all entail to resolve these three issues. Note that these issues can
only be resolved if some additional constraints are imposed. These constraints are:
arbitrage, optimality and equilibrium; these will be further discussed next.
2.3.2 Consumption-based model
In order to get the best benefit, an investor, at any time, must decide how much
to consume now and how much to save (invest) for future consumption, and what
portfolio (collection of investments) of assets to hold. The most intuitive rule to de-
cide how much to invest and what portfolio to hold for an investor can be specified
by Expected Utility Theory (EUT) developed in 1944 by von Newman and Morgen-
stern [173]. The EUT hypothesizes that an investor maximizes his total expected
utility out of sequential consumptions generated from his proposed portfolio. Such
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an optimization will result in a best price for the individual, which is referred to as
a problem of optimality. However, a consensus price of a risky asset cannot be solely
determined according to the best benefit of one individual investor, but instead it
must be determined by aggregating all price proposals from all different investors
who are interested in the same asset. This resultant price is called an equilibrium
price (based on the balance of demand and supply forces). Another important con-
dition for an equilibrium price to be uniquely determined is an assumption of no
arbitrage (possibility of risk-less gains); if there exists obvious arbitrage opportunity,
any rational investors will take the advantage and consequently it will disappear.
It is easy to see that, in such a consumption-based model, utility measure plays a
critical role in the price setting, thus it is worthwhile to elaborate.
2.3.3 Utility function and risk preferences
Utility function, U(x), assigns a happiness (utility) score to each package of con-
sumption, x, of goods or services. Utility theory [173] assumes that humankind is
rational: he prefers more to less and maximizes his utility whenever possible. It
is believed that most rational investors are risk averse: preferring the sure gain to
the equivalent (but uncertain) expected gain; such preference can be quantified by a
utility function. These two behavioral preferences (prefer more to less and sure gain
to expected gain), as the most general constraints, restrict the risk-averse utility
function form to be strictly increasing (U ′ >0) and concave (U ′′ <0). Arrow [4]
and Pratt [141] suggested two measures of risk aversion: an “absolute measure”:
RA(x) = −U ′′(x)/U ′(x) and a “relative measure”: RR(x) = −xU ′′(x)/U ′(x). The
most supported risk aversion patterns from numerous experimental and empirical
studies are those of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) (pp. 64 in [117]). These two risk aversion measures further
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restrict the valid utility functional forms. It can be shown that, in fact, the only
utility function that simultaneously satisfies the two restrictions is a power utility
function, for which the most popular form is U(x, γ) = x
1−γ−1
1−γ ; where γ is a risk
aversion index (coefficient) characterizing the degree of risk aversion of an investor:
the larger it is, the more risk averse an investor is; and vice versa. An investor
with a risk aversion index of zero (the lower limit) is characterized as risk-neutral.
We shall use the above power utility function and consider agent specific and time-
varying risk aversion indices in our study of a model of dynamic risk averse agents
in Chapter 5.
2.3.4 An alternative risk preference: Prospect Theory
Although the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) is one of most central theoretical foun-
dations of asset pricing, some important experimental evidences show contradiction
to it. When it comes to decision making under uncertainty in some experiments,
subjects use decision weights over the objective probabilities [143, 79], instead of
expected objective probabilities themselves. Other contradicting evidences found
are that subjects have certain probability preference [51, 52]. A breakthrough was
made by Kahneman and Tversky [96] through their experiments, showing behaviors
of the subjects in contradicting the EUT. The main points in their findings are:
• The subjects used decision weights, w(p), rather than objective probabilities,
p (agreed with the early reports by Edwards [51, 52])
• The investors made decisions based on change of wealth, ∆W , rather than total
terminal wealth, W +∆W , assumed by EUT (consistent with the hypothesis
of Markowitz [127]).
• The subjects maximized the expected value function, V (∆W ), rather than
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the expected utility function, U(W +∆W ), where the value function is convex
for ∆W ≤ 0 and concave for ∆W > 0. The value function, V (∆W ), passes
through the origin with V (0) = 0, forming an S-shaped value function curve
(consistent with the hypothesis of Markowitz [127]);
• The subjects optimized their stock portfolio and saving accounts separately,
instead of optimizing their assets together as EUT implies.
These findings, referred as Prospect Theory (PT), have given rise to a great chal-
lenge to the popular EUT, and have had significant impact on the understanding
and modeling of investors’ behavior. There are quite a few important advantages of
the PT over the EUT. One of the most important advantages is that the PT allows
a risk-seeking behavior in its risk preference framework, which is very important
as the risk-seeking is commonly practiced in the real-world. However significant
these findings are, one of the most obvious shortcomings of the Prospect Theory of
Kahneman and Tversky is that it is difficult to quantify these findings and integrate
them into a compact and unified functional form so that analytical work can be
further developed. Although there are efforts reported in the literature in searching
for a compact form of value function to describe these important experiment obser-
vations [107], a well accepted function form has not been reported yet. In addition,
in their experiments [51, 52] the objective decision weighting results are based on
questionnaires that were designed to test subjects’ preference if they were given few
chances, which may be true for individual investors. However, for institutional in-
vestors their preferences may be different from individual investors as the former
has multiple chances to make decisions7, which may drive their preferences closer to
the expected utility paradigm. These are some of the reasons why the EUT is still
7When someone is given few chances to bet, he may prefer a sure gain to an uncertain but larger
gain; however, if he is given many chances of similar scenarios, his preferences might be different
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popular in asset pricing research, especially for the analytical oriented work. In this
thesis, we use EUT as it provides a more convenient framework for our study of the
price impact of investors’ dynamic risk aversion on price dynamics.
2.4 Modeling Financial Time Series
The financial time series (FTS) we will be analyzing mainly include daily series and
high-frequency time series generated from real records of traded stocks and indices.
Since the time series originate from different assets, different trading periods, and
different markets, their price behaviors must be very different. For example, a time
series for a short-term interest rate may look dramatically different from a time
series of an individual stock. However, we will not delve into asset-specific details,
but instead study their most common statistical features and the generic dynamics.
2.4.1 Statistics of returns
A distribution of past returns provides valuable implications on their future values
provided the return process in the future follows the “same mechanism” as before.
In general, a distribution of a random variable will be well characterized by its
moments of various orders. A distribution of asset return series, X(t), can be well
described by its: mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis. These statistics can be
calculated withmarginal (i.e. unconditional) distribution or conditional distribution.
While the marginal statistics characterize the global features of the time series, it
is the conditional statistics that describe the dynamics. We start with the marginal
statistics:
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A. Moments of returns
Imagine that we have I systems and use them to generate the sequences of I time
series, {y(1)t }∞t=−∞, {y(2)t }∞t=−∞,...,{y(I)t }∞t=−∞, and consider the observation at date
(or time) t, we have the sequence:
{y(1)t , y(2)t , ..., y(I)t }
which can be viewed as a sample of I realizations of random variable Yt.
Mean: Let fYt(yt) be the marginal density, then the marginal expectation (or mean)
of t-th observation of the above time series is defined as:




provided it exists. This can be calculated as the probability limit of the ensemble
average:



















t − µt] · [Y (i)t−j − µt−j ] (2.5)
the “self-autocovariance” γ0,t = σ
2
t = V[Yt] is called as variance; the square root of
the variance σt =
√
V[Yt] is called as standard deviation or volatility in financial












2.4.2 Stationarity and white noise
If both the mean µt and autocovariances γj,t are independent of date t, then the
process for Yt is said to be covariance-stationary or weakly stationary:
E(Yt) = µ for all t
E(Yt − µ)(Yt−j − µ) = γj for all t and any j
A more restrictive process is the strictly stationary. A process is said to be strictly
stationary if, for any values of j1, j2, ..., jn, the joint distribution of (Yt+j1, Yt+j2, ..., Yt+jn)
depends on only the intervals separating the date (j1, j2, ..., jn) and not the date itself
(t).
A process {εt}∞t=−∞ is called a white noise process if all their elements have mean
zero and variance σ2, and are uncorrelated cross time:
E(εt) = 0 (2.8)
E(ε2t ) = σ
2 (2.9)
E(εtετ ) = 0 for t 6= τ (2.10)
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For a Gaussian process with non-zero mean, µ 6= 0, the demeaned process Zt = Yt−µ
has the above pdf. Thus the Gaussian process is uniquely described by its mean
(µ) and variance (σ2), denoted as f(x;µ, σ2) ∼ N(µ, σ2). It is easy to see that for
the Gaussian process, skewness =0 and kurtosis=3. The Gaussian process is most
widely used as a benchmark upon which various stochastic process or time series are
compared.
2.4.3 Ergodicity and estimation of expectation
The definition of expectations of a time series in terms of ensemble average only
serves as a theoretical concept, but cannot be applied directly in practice. In prac-
tice, all one usually has available is a single realization of T observations, of a process









Whether this sample mean eventually converges to the ensemble concept E(Yt),
is related to ergodicity. A time series process, {Yt}∞t=−∞ is ergodic if for any two
bounded functions that map vectors in the a and b dimensional real vector spaces
to real scalars, f : Ra → R1 and g : Rb → R1,
lim
k→∞
|E[f(yt, yt+1, ..., yt+a)g(yt+k, yt+k+1, ..., yt+k+b)]|
= |E[f(yt, yt+1, ..., yt+a)]||E[g(yt+k, yt+k+1, ..., yt+k+b)]| (2.13)
This definition states that if events are separated far enough in time, then they
are “asymptotically independent”, which is an essential condition for a meaningful
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parameter estimation with “time average” statistics to approximate the “ensemble
average” statistics. For example, the Ergodic Theorem states:
If {Yt}∞t=−∞ is a time series which is covariance-stationary and ergodic and E[|yt|]
is a finite constant and E[Yt] = µ, and if y¯T = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 yt, then y¯T → µ almost
surely (a.s.) which implies the convergence in probability and in mean square (m.s.)
8. With this ergodicity assumption, we shall apply time-average to approximate
statistical analysis of ensemble-average for parameter estimation in data analysis
throughout this thesis.
2.4.4 Conditional statistical analysis
There are two frameworks for estimating statistics: the static (unconditional, mar-
ginal or historical) approach (as described in previous subsections) and the dynam-
ical (conditional) approach. While the marginal statistics describes a global feature
of the time series, it is the conditional statistics that describes the dynamics of the
series. With a conditional constraint, the dynamical (conditional) statistics, such
as mean, variance/covariance, skewness and kurtosis, etc. can be similarly defined
as the marginal ones. Such constraint is the “condition” imposed to each estimate:
only those data that belong to the class specified by the “condition” are counted
in. In practice, such condition is usually specified as a group of events/information
that happened or are available at the time of the forecasting.
2.4.5 Measures of volatility
In empirical study, since it is commonly observed and believed that asset return
follows martingale (expected future return is zero), volatility has become one of
8see for example: p.44 in White [163], and p.133 in Davidson [44]
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the cornerstones of theory of modern finance. Volatility is central to Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe and Lintner [148, 119], the option pricing model
of Black and Scholes [15], and value-at-risk (VaR) modeling of banks and financial
institutions, etc. Thus, measuring and estimating volatility has been one of the
central focuses of financial research. Although the simple historical (moving average)
volatility is intuitive, some other (conditional) measures are commonly applied:
The EWMA volatility9:
The exponentially weighted moving average model is defined as:
σ2t = λσ
2
t−1 + (1− λ)Y 2t−1 (2.14)
where Yt is the return at time t, σt is the volatility estimated at time t, and λ(< 1)
is the weighting factor.
The ARCH/GARCH volatility:
The ARCH volatility introduced by Engle [53] in 1982 signified a breakthrough
in modeling of time-varying volatility by way of autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity (ARCH), which is described as:






where Ft = {Yt−j : j ≥ 1} is the information set available at time t, α0 > 0, and
αj ≥ 0, j = 1, .., q, Yt = zth1/2t , and {zt} is a sequence of iid random variable with
zero mean and unit variance.
9The EWMA volatility is a special case of the model: σ2(t) =
∑m
i=1 αiY
2(t−i) with αi+1 = λαi
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The GARCH(p,q) [18] volatility is described by the model:











where α0 > 0, and αj ≥ 0, j = 1, .., q, and βj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., p are the parameters to
be estimated. In practice, the GARCH(1,1) is the most frequently applied GARCH
specification. We shall show that despite the tremendous success, the GARCH
volatility fails to reproduce some of the empirical observations in the time-aggregate
property of volatility clustering described using kurtosis.
2.4.6 Measures of excess volatility and volatility clustering
Excess volatility is usually measured by the kurtosis of the return series, which is
used to characterize the empirical observation that the probability density func-
tions (PDF) of asset return usually have higher-peak and fatter-tails than that of
a Gaussian PDF. If a kurtosis of a return series is larger than that of Gaussian se-
ries, then the return distribution is said to be leptokurtic, it is platykurtic otherwise.
Most FTS of stock prices and stock indices are leptokurtic, suggesting that the ex-
tremely large (positive or negative) returns have larger probability than Gaussian
PDF. This is one of the key stylized facts observed in empirical study in early 1960s
by Mandelbrot [124].
The most commonly used measures of volatility clustering are the autocorrelation
functions (ACFs) of absolute returns raised to the power of θ ∈ (0,2] 10. Due to the
“Taylor Effect” 11, the ACFs of absolute returns are among the most popularl in
10It is well observed that ACFs of returns for real FTS are close to zero, i.e. the returns are
known to be uncorrelated
11The ACFs of absolute returns raised to the power θ are maximized when θ is around 1, that
is, the largest ACFs are found in the absolute returns [158]
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practice. The second most popular are the ACFs of square returns as they have an
analytical connection to GARCH(1,1) parameters. Although popular, these ACFs,
as a measure of volatility clustering, have two shortcomings: 1) it is difficult to
compare the strengths of the volatility clustering from different FTS; and 2) it
is difficult to give clear variation of volatility clustering over time for the same
FTS. There are some other measures of volatility clustering such as, forward partial
derivatives of volatility with regards to the return and “half-life” of volatility, etc.
[57] However none of these measures gives a satisfying good quantitative measure of
volatility clustering. We shall explore how to tackle these problems by introducing
a simple and reliable quantitative measure of volatility clustering in the next chapter.
2.4.7 Summary of stylized statistical facts
Since the pioneering work of Mandelbrot [124] in the early 1960’s, several important
statistical stylized facts have been revealed, including excess kurtosis [124, 60, 20,
125, 39], volatility clustering [124, 61, 53, 9, 37, 146, 140, 35], asymmetry [17, 135],
leverage effects, and slow decaying of autocorrelation function of absolute/squared
return etc. While all these stylized facts are important issues, we shall focus on
excess volatility and the associated volatility clustering and the underlying dynamics.
In particular, we will explore the following questions: 1) how to quantitatively
measure volatility clustering (in Chapter 3); 2) how to model the volatility clustering
(Chapter 4); and 3) what is the underlying dynamical mechanism for the volatility
clustering (Chapter 5).
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2.5 Agent-Based Modeling
This section reviews the recent development of agent-based modeling in economics
and finance. Study of economics and finance is undergoing an important paradigm
shift, from a representative, rational agent approach towards a bounded rational, het-
erogeneous agent-based approach. Such a change has significant impact on the way
through which the economic and financial system is understood and will therefore
bring many new insights into the “true” operating mechanism of the dynamics of the
system. Here we only highlight those important aspects which are directly related
to our research focus; the choice thus is unavoidably biased. For a more compre-
hensive and updated review the reader is referred to Tesfatsion [162] (Agent-based
computational economics), LeBaron [114] (Agent-based computational finance), and
Hommes [88] (Heterogeneous agent-based models in economics and finance) and the
references therein. In the next subsection, we highlight some important reasons
why agent-based modeling should be the way to go. In subsection 2 we discuss
both the challenges and the opportunities the ABM faces. We examine the current
status of the research with ABM in subsection 3. The last subsection identifies an
important key feature that is still missing in the current research focuses of ABM:
dynamic risk aversion. We discuss how this key feature can be integrated into the
ABM framework and how it affects the system dynamics.
2.5.1 Why agent-based modeling?
Although much progress has been made in both theoretical and empirical study in fi-
nancial asset pricing, the underlying mechanism of financial system remains unclear.
In particular, the causal effect of investors’ behavior on all the observed phenomena
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is still not clear. The availability of large-scale financial data with trading infor-
mation recorded in tick-by-tick and high computational power provide researchers
with great opportunity to explore this challenging problem from a new perspective:
agent-based financial modeling. As a matter of fact all financial systems consist of
interacting agents and all the FTS are the results of the investors’ investment activ-
ities generated by these investors. Therefore, only if we have a good understanding
on investors’ behaviors, can we come up with a ”correct” model to explain and re-
produce the phenomena observed in the market. Thus, to model the FTS through
agents’ behavior is to tackle the problem from the root. One would ask, then, why
the early research efforts were not in this line? This is because the economic and
financial systems are complex dynamic systems, and study of such systems faces
many challenges. We will highlight some most important challenges in the next
subsection.
2.5.2 The challenges of the agent-based modeling
The study of economics and finance with ABM faces many great challenges. Firstly,
the market consists of intelligent, competing and heterogeneous agents. These agents
have different beliefs in the market, different abilities to acquire and process mar-
ket information, and mutually conflicting interests; there exists no price consensus
on the future price for any risky financial asset. As a result, simple, linear, and
deterministic equations can/should not be sought as a reliable description of the
system. Instead, a more sophisticated, non-linear and stochastic model must be
sought. Secondly, each agent’s decision depends on his estimate of price expecta-
tions of other agents who also make their own estimates; this precludes expectations
being formed by deductive means and leaves inductive reasoning as the only choice
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[6]. A market of agents employing inductive reasoning often exhibits irrational herd-
ing behavior [10, 39], resulting in excessive price fluctuations or sometimes market
bubbles and crashes. In such market agents’ sentiment and degrees of risk aversion
play critical roles in determining the price dynamics. Thirdly, agents can learn and
therefore adapt their strategies dynamically to improve their performance; this ex-
acerbates the unpredictability of the markets. The change in an investor’s strategy
or behavior can be the cause or the result of the investor’s changing sentiment [12],
represented by (pessimistic) under-reaction or (optimistic) over-reaction to market
dynamics driven by arrival of new information and changing market macro/micro-
environments. These characteristics of the financial market (competing with dif-
ferent beliefs and conflicting interests, interdependence of price expectations, and
unpredictable changes of risk aversion) may lead to the formation of the so-called
noise traders behavior. DeLong et al [45] have found this to be a (behavioral) source
for price to diverge significantly from the fundamental value in financial markets –
the so called “noise trading effect”12. Lastly, agents have different risk preferences
and tolerance levels, which may be dynamically changing in response to the agents’
past performances. Such dynamic risk aversion, aggregated, acts like a catalyst to
the price anomalies, giving rise to excessive price fluctuation far away from the ”fun-
damental value”. All these challenges must be properly addressed in a good ABM.
We now examine how these challenges have been addressed.
2.5.3 The current status of ABM
The current status of ABM research can be best reviewed by looking at how well it
has addressed the challenges mentioned above.
12the term ”noise traders” is due to Kyle [113] and Black [16]
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Modeling heterogeneous expectations
The first key issue to address is the heterogeneous beliefs of individual agents in the
market. Although the opinions on the future prices from all agents are different,
they can be simply classified into two opposite categories: up-market believers, and
down-market believers, which constitute into two opposite market forces. All ABMs
must have these two essential elements in their construction (either implicitly or
explicitly) and there are many different ways to model these opposite market forces.
From a methodology point of view, the market forces can also be classified into two
types of investors: fundamentalists, and chartists [172, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 160, 150].
Fundamentalists base their trading strategies on market fundamentals which include
both microeconomic factors, such as earning, dividends, and technologies, etc, and
macroeconomic factors, such as growth rate, unemployment rate, etc. They estimate
market fundamental values for future asset prices from the market fundamentals and
buy the undervalued assets and sell the overvalued assets. Chartists try to detect
price patterns through technical analysis of historical data and exploit these patterns
in their trading decisions. In a survey study, Taylor and Allen [160] shows that, from
the late seventies to the late eighties, there was a significant shift toward chartists
in the fund managers portfolio for exchange markets. Frankel and Froot [68] built
an exchange rate model which consists of three types of agents: fundamentalists,
chartists, and portfolio managers (who build their strategies based on the dynamic
balance of fundamentalists and chartists) and demonstrated that the chartists will
not be driven out of the market.
From the behavioral perspective the market participants can be categorized as
rational arbitrageurs (or informed rational speculators), and noise traders (or posi-
tive feedback traders) [45, 46, 152, 149, 113, 16]. Rational arbitrageurs are investors
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who form fully rational expectations about assets future returns; while noise traders
are those investors whose trading strategies are based on technical indicators ob-
tained through analysis of historical data. DeLong et al [45] show that when noise
traders are bullish they can earn higher expected returns, which again contradicts
the efficient market hypothesis.
Modeling interacting and learning agents
Another key feature in ABM is that the agents are interacting and learning all the
time; increasing research efforts on incorporating this feature can be found in the
literature [64, 102, 103, 24, 25, 22, 104, 6]. The Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market
[6, 115] is one of the well-known models to address the issue of agents’ interdependent
future price expectations and of agents’ adaptive learning. This model shows that
when the agents learn slowly, the market is consistent with rational expectation
with low trading volume; when they learn fast the market gives rises to some excess
volatility with increased trading volume. However the excess volatility and the
associated volatility clustering the model generated are far less than what observed
in the real market. This is probably due to the fact that the model (although quite
sophisticated in its construction), has missed a key factor in the dynamics: the time-
varying risk aversions of the agents. We shall address this issue in more details in
Chapter 5.
Another early model with interacting agents was introduced by Follmer [64], which
shows that short-range interaction of agents may lead to aggregate uncertainty caus-
ing a disequilibrium price process.
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Modeling complex dynamics
Arthur [6] is a good reference on this topic. The agents’ adaptive learning can be
modeled with an evolutionary dynamics. The last issue of different risk preferences
and tolerance levels of heterogeneous agents can only be addressed by considering
the dynamic risk aversion an essential part of the system. We will give an outline
on this issue in the next subsection and will give more detailed discussion in Chapter
5.
Dynamic risk aversion: a critical factor in ABM
As mentioned in the introduction, the dynamic risk aversion (DRA) may be the key
to understanding the underlying mechanism of scaling, clustering and dynamics of
volatility in FTS. Therefore we will give detailed study of DRA in Chapter 5 where
we show that the DRA model is indeed able to explain the emergence of most of the
“stylized” facts exhibited in real FTS. There are two key issues to be addressed:
1. how to introduce and incorporate DRA into the framework of ABM;
2. how to “derive” a price setting formula under a popular power utility function.
We try to model DRA with a constant-variance bounded random walk process and
apply some approximation technique to obtain a price formula.
2.6 Modeling Interactive Agents with Evolution-
ary Minority Game
Minority game (MG) model [30, 31] turns out to be a very useful tool for studying
the general statistical property of the financial market as a game of interacting and
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competing agents. The market behavior can be understood by studying: 1) how
agents interact with the market and with other agents; and 2) how the market
evolves. How agents construct and maintain their strategies, can be modeled by
specifying whether agents use probabilistic trend-based strategies or adaptive and
“deterministic” strategies, or whether their strategies are based on local (networked)
or global (market historical) information. How the system evolves can be explored
by specifying the evolution mechanism of the MG. Here we give a brief overview of
these issues.
2.6.1 Population distribution of agents’ probabilistic trend-
based strategies in EMG
In the context of a simple evolutionary minority game (EMG) where agents’ adopt
probabilistic trend-based strategies, the population distribution of competing agents
provides important information on market efficiency; such population distribution
may depend on system variables (parameters), so a thorough study on the impact of
these variables may help give a more complete understanding of the general property
of dynamics and phase transition of the market. However such a study has not been
reported. Thus we will try to give a comprehensive study aiming to answer the
questions:
• what is the generic mechanism for the dynamics and phase transition of pop-
ulation distribution; and
• how does it depend on the system variables (parameters)?
We will explore the problem using both analytical and numerical approaches in
Chapter 6.
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2.6.2 Dynamics and phase structure of EMG with deter-
ministic and adaptive strategies
In the original MG model [30], agents’ strategies are based on the market history,
but they are adaptive and deterministic. The impact of evolution on such MG model
has been studied by Yuan and Chen[168], in which each agent evolves individually
whenever his wealth reaches the specified bankruptcy level.13 In some earlier works
[118, 167], it was reported that evolution helps improve the game significantly yet
the overall structure of the so-called Savit [145] curve (the functional curve of the
variance of winning agents with regard to the system memory size) remains similar.
We believe that such result is due to the inefficiency of the evolution scheme used
in their studies 14 and therefore propose a more efficient evolution scheme to study
the effect of the evolution in the MG. Our study shows that our simple evolutionary
scheme greatly suppresses herding behavior and therefore results in substantially
better performance. The curve of σ2/N as a function of 2M/N can be characterized
by a universal curve but with a very different phase structure from the one found in
the early study of EMG [118, 167], especially in the region where the memory sizes
of agents are small. This gives a curve of flat S-shape, dramatically different from
the V − shape curve reported in [118, 167].
2.6.3 Network based EMG with adaptive strategies
Here we briefly review the study of the dynamics in network minority games (NMG)
in which each agent bases their strategies upon the strategies of a few other agents
13This scheme of evolution is substantially more efficient than the one used in the previous works
[118]
14In their scheme, evolution takes place for every epoch which was set as 10,000 time steps and
only a certain percentage of worst agents are asked to evolve. As a result, it may take very long
time for system to reach a steady-state with the evolution.
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[169]. In recent years, the study of the organization of complex networks has at-
tracted intensive research interest [1, 136, 49, 157, 11, 165, 170].
The dynamics of a complex network can be studied in the context of a system of
interactive elements (agents) on the network; it depends on how the network is or-
ganized and how the elements interact. Recently there are a few studies of dynamics
of complex network with minority game model. Paczuski et al [137] considered the
MG model on a random network to study the self-organized process which leads to
a stationary but intermittent state. Galstyan [71] studied a network MG, focusing
on how the change of the mean connectivity K of a random network affects the
global coordination of the system of different capacities. Anghel et al [3] used the
MG model to investigate how interagent’s communications across a network lead
to a formation of an influence network. However a general question of how differ-
ent network organizations affect the dynamics of the system in the context of the
network MG, and what is the effect of evolution has not been answered yet.
To answer the above question, we study the evolutionary dynamics of complex
network with the minority game model of Challet and Zhang [30]. In particular we
would like to know 1) how the dynamics and phase structure of the network minority
game depend on the network organization, and 2) how evolution affects the dynamics
and phase structure of the game. To accomplish it, we investigate the dynamics of
network minority games with evolution on three generic networks: Kauffman’s NK
networks (Kauffman nets) [99], growing directed networks (GDNets), and growing
directed networks with a small fraction of link reversals (GDRNets) [170]. We
show that the dynamics and the associated phase structure of the game depend
crucially on the structure of the underlying network. The dynamics on GDNets is
very stable for all values of the connection number K, in contrast to the dynamics on
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Kauffman’s NK networks, which becomes chaotic when K > Kc = 2. The dynamics
of GDRNets, on the other hand, is near critical. Under a simple evolutionary
scheme, the network system with a “near” critical dynamics evolves to a high level
of global coordination among its agents; this suggests that criticality leads to the
best performance. For Kauffman nets with K > 3, the evolutionary scheme has no
effect on the dynamics (it remains chaotic) and the performance of the MG resembles
that of a random choice game (RCG).
2.7 Conclusion
The financial markets are believed to play a critically important role in the econ-
omy, thus they have been widely studied over more than a century. Among all the
important statistical “stylized” facts found, the excess volatility and the associated
clustering of FTS have been the most widely studied subjects as they have very
important theoretical and practical significance.
To study volatility clustering, one needs a good quantitative and direct measure
(definition) for it. There are many proposals for measuring volatility clustering, but
none of the reported gives a satisfying result. Therefore, searching for a good mea-
sure of it is still a necessary first step in modeling the FTS and we shall explore this
issue in details in Chapter 3. Modeling FTS and in particular its volatility clus-
tering is one of the central issues in both theory and application of financial study.
There exist many important works, among which, the GARCH-type model stands
out as the most well studied and applied model. Despite its popularity, the GARCH
model has some critical shortcomings which prevent the model from being directly
applied to describe the dynamics and the volatility clustering in real FTS. There
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is a need to gain better understanding of the shortcomings of the GARCH model
and to look for better alternatives. We shall investigate these problems in Chapter
4. The agent-based modeling has emerged recently as one of the most promis-
ing tools for understanding the underlying “market mechanism” of price dynamics
from investors’ behavior perspectives and we shall explore this problem in Chapter
5. Recently there have been growing interests in studying financial market with
a minority game model from which the general statistical property of the financial
market can be studied as a game of interacting and competing agents. With such
approach, one can study the mechanism for agent’s behaviors and obtain possible
understanding or interpretation of market impact and market inefficiency in finan-
cial markets. With the MG model, the price impact due to the two key ingredients:
how agents make their investment decisions and how markets evolve, can be inves-
tigated with a statistical mechanical approach. In Chapter 6, we apply the MG tool
to study the impact of evolution on the population distribution of agent’s strategy
and the phase structure describing market efficiency of the system.
Chapter 3
Volatility Clustering in Financial Time
Series
Volatility clustering is the focus in theoretical and empirical financial study as it em-
bodies volatility forecasting which is the central issue in many financial applications.
In this chapter we study volatility clustering and its related properties in character-
izing financial time series (FTS). We review some of the most commonly used mea-
sures of volatility clustering and point out the shortcomings of these measures. We
then introduce a new quantitative and direct measure of volatility clustering based
on conditional probability measure of volatility. We show that the new measure we
introduced is not only able to quantify the volatility clustering of different strengths,
but also reveals a universal feature of volatility clustering of FTS. This conditional
probability distribution may be used as another characterization of financial return





Volatility clustering is an empirical observation that: large (small) financial asset
returns (positive or negative) have a tendency to be followed by large (small) returns
of either sign. It was first observed by Mandelbrot [124] and Fama [61] in the early
1960s, and the phenomena has been reported in numerous other studies [146, 37, 9].
The importance of volatility clustering lies in the fact that it has critical implications
in almost all financial applications, such as risk management and control, derivative
pricing and hedging, market making, portfolio optimization, and many others. An-
other fact that makes it significant to study volatility and its associated properties
is that empirical study shows that financial returns are temporally uncorrelated, so
study of past returns may not be useful for forecasting future asset price, but useful
for forecasting future volatility. Since volatility is highly correlated, its dynamics
can be characterized; this has great value in financial theory and application.
In order to perform quantitative analysis, we need a quantitative measure (or
definition) of volatility clustering. There are a few ways to describe volatility clus-
tering [57]. The Autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of absolute returns raised to the
power of θ (∈ (0,2]) are commonly used to describe volatility clustering [158]. In
practice, the ACFs of absolute returns are most commonly used due to the well-
known “Taylor Effect” which claims that empirically the sample autocorrelations of
absolute financial returns are larger than those of squared returns. Another way to
describe the volatility clustering is to measure the “half-life” of volatility, i.e., the
time taken for the volatility to move halfway back to its unconditional mean [57].
However, these measures have some common important shortcomings: 1) it is not
easy to quantitatively compare the strengths of the volatility clustering in FTS; 2)
it is difficult to give clear time dependence of volatility clustering for the same FTS.
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We tackle the above problems by introducing a conditional probability distribu-
tion (CPD) as a quantitative measure of volatility clustering. We show that such a
measure is not only able to consistently quantify the volatility clustering with dif-
ferent strengths, but also reveals a universal feature of volatility clustering of FTS.
This may qualify the CPD as another characterization of financial return series and
therefore can be used as a useful tool in empirical study of FTS.
In the next section, we review excess volatility and its associated volatility clus-
tering. Section 3 introduces a new measure of volatility clustering based on a con-
ditional probability distribution of returns. Section 4 gives intensive analysis of a
variety of market data with the CDP. The last section summarizes.
3.2 Excess Volatility and Associated Clustering
Excess volatility and its associated clustering are the two most important features
in financial return time series. The excess volatility describes how volatile a series is
and it is usually measured with the fourth moment (kurtosis) of the series, which is a
marginal statistics. When the kurtosis value of a time series is larger than 3 (which
is the kurtosis value of the Gaussian process), the time series is said to have excess
volatility. Volatility clustering on the other hand describes the dynamics of the
volatility which embodies critically important implications for forecasting financial
asset price movement. Understanding excess volatility, volatility clustering and their
relation is the key issue in financial study. In this section, we review their major
characteristics and highlight the key issue of measuring volatility clustering, which
is our focus in this chapter.
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Table 3.1: Four moments of the daily returns for some S&P component stocks
Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
BA 0.000404 0.020954 0.120046 7.789419
GM 0.000046 0.016745 -0.278168 11.197504
IBM 0.000285 0.016392 -0.252328 15.635426
KO 0.000432 0.015600 -0.451771 18.613443
PCG 0.000079 0.016684 -2.748959 113.670906
3.2.1 Excess volatility of financial asset series
Excess volatility of a financial return time series is well described by the kurtosis
of the returns. It is well known that the kurtosis value for a Gaussian (random
walk) process is equal to 3, the excess volatility of real financial return time series
is evaluated by comparing its kurtosis value to that of the Gaussian process. Most
of real financial return time series are found to have larger kurtosis values than
3, suggesting that they have excess volatility. The Table 3.1 shows the first four
moments of the daily returns for some S&P500 component stocks (between 1962-01
and 2004-12).
We can see from the table that: 1) the mean values of returns for all these five
S&P component stocks are insignificant (about two orders smaller in magnitude)
compared to their volatility (measured by S.D. of the returns); and 2) their kur-
tosis values are all significantly larger than 3, meaning that they exhibit excessive
volatility.
3.2.2 Volatility clustering and its measures
While excess volatility describes how much more volatile a process is compared to
a Gaussian process, it is volatility clustering that describes the dynamics of the
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Figure 3.1: The ACFs of absolute daily returns for some S&P component stocks (between 1962-10
and 2004-12)
volatility. Now let us examine volatility clustering as reflected in the ACFs. Fig. 3.1
shows the ACFs of absolute daily returns for the five S&P500 component stocks1.
From this figure we can see that compared to the ACF of the Gaussian process, all
the stocks have significant higher ACF values. One of the stylized facts found in
real FTS [158] is the fact that ACFs of absolute returns start low (from T = 1) but
approach to zero at very long time lag.
We see (by comparing the ACFs in the Fig. 3.1 and their kurtosis values listed in
the Table 3.1) that for real financial return time series, an excess volatility is always
associated with a volatility clustering; the higher the excess volatility, the stronger
the volatility clustering. However, the ACFs as a measure of volatility clustering
are essentially illustrative, not quantitative. Another simple measure of volatility
clustering is the “half-life” of volatility, defined as the time taken for the volatility
1It is easy to see that ACFs of the returns for real FTS exhibit no different behavior from
a random walk series and they are close to zero; this suggests that returns are not sequentially
correlated
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to move halfway back to its unconditional mean. As we know that the volatility
for any FTS fluctuates in time, it is difficult to obtain a precise “half-life” time.
There are also some other measures suggested, such as taking a derivative of the
volatility (or its moving average) with respect to the current squared return [57].
But these measures are difficult to compute to give a reliable quantitative measure
of volatility clustering in practice. Thus a more direct and quantitative measure of
volatility clustering is still needed. We will try to tackle this problem by introducing
a new measure to quantify the volatility clustering in the next section.
3.3 Conditional Probability Distribution of Asset
Returns as a Measure of Volatility Clustering
In this section, we introduce a new quantitative measure of volatility clustering. It
is defined as a conditional probability distribution (CPD), P (r/rp;T ), of the asset
return r of the current time interval T , given the return rp in the previous time
interval of the same duration. Here the parameter T indicates the time aggregate
interval on which the returns are measured. We describe in detail how to construct
the CPD of returns and how to use it to measure volatility clustering of the market
data.
3.3.1 Construction of the CPD
The conditional probability distribution P (r/rp;T ) can be estimated in the following
steps. 1) Choose the number (Nb) of conditional distributions to be computed; 2)
Determine the return ranges for each of the Nb bins; 3) Group the return data into
different bins according to the value of previous return rp; and 4) Compute the
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probability distributions of the returns r for all the Nb bins.
For example if we have five returns in a series: 0.0010, 0.0015, 0.0012, 0.0018 and
0.0021, and we want to group them into two conditional groups with the ranges of
the previous returns being: rp,1 ∈ (0, 0.0012] and rp,2 ∈ (0.0012, 0.0018]. Then the
conditional return data in group rp,1 are: 0.0015 and 0.0018; and the return data in
group rp,2 are: 0.0012, and 0.0021.
3.3.2 The choice of the number of conditional returns
In principle, the number Nb of the conditional distributions can be any arbitrary
integer. However, in practice, it is constrained by the size of the data set available.
There is no clear-cut rule, but one should make sure that there are sufficient data
points in each bin of previous returns for a meaningful distribution. Here we choose
Nb = 6 ∼ 14 for analyzing daily data such as Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
(28000 data points) and SP500Index (∼ 10000 data points), as well as high-frequency
data (sampled in minutes).
3.3.3 Determination of the widths of the bins
There are two steps involved. 1) Get minimum and maximum value of previous
returns from all the paired return data in question, which are used as the lower
and upper boundary of the return bins for the previous return rp; 2) Determine the
width of each bin: the simplest way to do that is to make a linear spacing, but this
does not produce any meaningful result as small returns are highly concentrated
while large returns are well dispersed. Thus a non-linear spacing of the previous
returns such as b2 (1 < b < 2) gives better results. Another alternative is to have
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the same or similar number of data points in each bin, which produces bins with
different widths. We use the last alternative as it gives the best result.
3.3.4 Estimation of the probability distribution
The return data aggregate in a particular group is computed in the usual way
of estimation of probability distribution to generate the return distribution. A
simple histogram approach is usually used to present a distribution. Here we use a
kernel estimator [153] to build the probability distribution. There are three main
advantages of using the kernel estimator: 1) it gives smoother distribution; 2) it
avoids the inconsistencies arisen from choosing different beginning point of returns
in calculation of the distribution; and 3) most importantly, the kernel estimator
guarantees the curve to be a probability density function (PDF).
3.3.5 Measuring volatility clustering with the CPD
The CPD gives both a qualitative description and a quantitative measure of volatility
clustering. Qualitatively, the return distribution conditioned on a (or a range of)
previous return reveals the dependency of the current return distribution on the
previous return. If the volatility is clustered, there should be positive dependency
of the current return range on the previous one. We will show that it is indeed the
case for real FTS.
To obtain a quantitative measure, we use the CPD to construct a functional
relationship between the width of the CPD of returns, w(r|rp;T ), to its previous
return, rp. If there is volatility clustering, such curves estimated from real market
data should show some linear dependency of the width of CPD, w(r|rp), on rp. We
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shall show that this is indeed the case in the next section by analyzing a variety
of market data. We show that the dependence of the width of CPDs, w(r|rp;T ),
on its previous return, rp, is linear at large returns for all financial asset return
series we analyzed. In addition, the conditional return distribution P (r/rp;T ), when
scaled by the scale factor w(r|rp), collapses to a universal curve P (r˜ = r/w(r|rp);T )
with a power law tail. The linear dependence of w(r|rp) on rp at large rp can be
approximated as: w(r|rp) = ηrp + w0, where η is a parameter which gives a direct
measure of the strength of volatility clustering. We will show, in the next section,
the universal feature we test is valid across different return series of different markets
and for a very wide range of aggregate time intervals of the returns, from minutes
to a few months.
3.4 Analyzing Asset Returns using CPDMeasure
In this section, we analyze various financial asset time series with the conditional
probability distribution (CPD) measure we introduced. The data we use here in-
cludes various daily individual stocks and stock indices, high frequency stocks and
indices, and tick-by-tick futures time series. We first present the CPD for returns of
various financial asset series showing a general property of volatility clustering: the
width of current return distribution is positively correlated with that of the previous
return. We show that such correlation can be well scaled to a universal curve for
all the asset time series. The properties of the FTS we show are rather general, i.e.
not only are they robust for all the financial asset series, but they are also valid for
a wide range of time horizons: from a few minutes to a few months. This is a clear,
generic, and ubiquitous statistical feature of volatility clustering that characterizes
financial asset time series.
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In the next subsection we show how some general properties of FTS can be de-
scribed by the CPD measure. Subsection 2 gives more detailed analysis of FTS
using CPDs. Subsection 3 describes how a quantitative measure can be constructed
with CPDs. The last subsection summarizes.
3.4.1 The CPDs for the returns of various financial asset
series
Let us first present results of the CPDs for some real financial return time series.
In order to see how robust the CPD measure is for the returns on different time
scales, we analyze the time series of both daily closing price and high frequency
intra-day price. These time series include various individual stocks, stock indices
and tick-by-tick future price series. Fig. 3.2 displays CPDs for both daily returns
and 5-minute returns for some FTS.
From Fig. 3.2 we can see that the CPDs are positively correlated with the previous
(absolute) return, i.e. the larger the previous (absolute) return, the wider the CPD
of current returns. Although here we only plot the results for a few individual
stocks and stock indices, we have checked many other data and obtained similar
results. Thus, this observation is rather robust for all financial asset time series
(with different strengths of the correlations for different asset time series). The
figure also shows that such positive correlation of volatility is true for both daily
time series and high frequency time series. As a matter of fact, we have checked the
result using other values of the time durations and found the above observation is
true for a very wide range (from a few minutes to a few months) of time durations.
Fig. 3.3 shows the CPDs of the returns for DJIA with different time durations; and
Fig. 3.4 shows the CPDs of the returns for QQQ with different durations.
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a) DJIA b) KO 
c) QQQ d). INTC 
Figure 3.2: The CPDs of returns for some FTS; panel a) plots CPDs for daily returns of
DJIA(between 1886-05 and 1999-07); panel b) is for the CPDs of daily returns for KO (between
1962-10 and 2004-12); panel c) is for the CPDs of 5-minute returns for QQQ (tracking NESDAQ
100 stocks, between 1999-04 and 2004-05); and panel d) is for the CPDs of 5-minute returns for
INTC (between 1995-01 and 2004-04)
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T=1 day T=2 days 
T=4 days 
T=8 days 
T=16 days T=32 days 
Figure 3.3: The CPDs of daily returns for DJIA with different time durations.
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T=5 min T=10 min 
T=30 min T=60 min 
T=120 min T=240 min 
Figure 3.4: The CPDs of returns for QQQ with different time (minute) durations.
3.4 Analyzing Asset Returns using CPD Measure 65
These two figures show that the CPDs for both daily return series and minute
return series qualitatively describe very well the volatility clustering for various time
durations. Thus we conclude that the volatility clustering measured by the CPDs
are a generic property of FTS.
To examine what the tail distribution looks like, we plot in a log-log scale for the
plot displayed in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, and these two plots are displayed in Fig. 3.5
and Fig. 3.6.
From Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 we can see that the CPDs exhibit good power law tail
with an exponent close to −4, which is the same as that of unconditional probability
distribution well outside of Le´vy regime (0 < α < 2) [74, 138]. Thus for the CPDs
we have two major observations: 1) the width of the CPDs is positively correlated to
its previous return; and 2) the CPDs behave the same as unconditional probability
distribution in terms of power-law tails.
The fact that the exponent is significantly larger than 2 means that the stock price
fluctuations cannot be described by either a Gaussian random walk or a Le´vy flight2.
We will demonstrate in the next chapter that the power-law tail of the distribution
is closely related to volatility clustering exhibited in the time series of stock market
data. The existence of volatility clustering in financial return time series is well
established. There is not, however, a good quantitative measure of it. We will show
how a quantitative measure naturally arises from the CPDs in the next subsection.
2If a heavy tailed distribution is a probability distribution which falls to zero as 1/|x|α+1, where
0 < α < 2, then it can be described by a Le´vy flight





















































































































































































































T=1 day T=2 days 
T=4 days T=8 days 



















return r return r
return r return r
return r return r
Figure 3.5: The power law tail of the CPDs of (positive) daily returns for DJIA with different
time durations.

















































































T=5 min T=10 min 
T=30 min T=60 min 
T=120 min T=240 min 
Figure 3.6: The power law tail of the CPDs of (positive) returns for QQQ with different time
(minute) durations.
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a). DJIA b). QQQ 
Figure 3.7: The widths w(r/|rp|) (measured as the standard deviations) of the CPDs of the
returns as functions of the volatility (measured by |rp|, the absolute returns) in the previous time
duration for daily DJIA and minute QQQ data.
3.4.2 Quantitative measure of volatility clustering with the
CPDs
The previous subsection shows that the CPDs describe a generic property of volatil-
ity clustering in financial time series (FTS). The description given there is still
qualitative; we now examine how well the CPDs describe the volatility clustering
quantitatively in this subsection. To illustrate the volatility correlation quantita-
tively, we need to compute the dependence of current volatility (expressed by width
of the distribution of current returns) on the return in the previous period. Fig.
3.7 plots the functional dependence of the width w(r/|rp|) (given by the standard
deviation) of CPD of returns on the previous absolute returns for daily data of DJIA
and minute data of QQQ.
This figure shows that, for larger returns, the width of the CPD depends ap-
proximately linearly on the return in the previous period. Such a dependence rela-
tionship can be approximated by a linear dependence of w(r|rp) on rp at large rp:
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w(r|rp) = ηrp + w0, where η is the parameter that gives a direct measure of the
strength of volatility clustering. We now examine the implications of this observa-
tion in the next subsection.
3.4.3 Universal curves of the CPDs of asset returns
In order to see if the linear dependence of the width, w(r|rp) of CPDs on its previous
return rp is consistent for a variety of market data. Here we plot scaled CPDs in
Fig. 3.2 ∼ 3.6. Each CPD is scaled by its scale factor, i.e., the width of the CPD of
the return, w(r|rp), computed as the standard deviation of the returns. These plots
are displayed in Fig. 3.8 ∼ 3.12.
From these figures we see that the CPDs indeed give a robust quantitative measure
of volatility clustering in various financial time series. We have checked many other
market data (not displayed here) and found that the results are similar. The salient
features the CPDs revealed can be summarized as: 1) the width of CPD of returns is
positively correlated with its previous return − a qualitative description of volatility
clustering; 2) the strength of such correlation can be approximated by a linear
dependence of the width of CPD on its previous return − a quantitative measure
of volatility clustering; 3) when the CPDs are rescaled by their respective width
they collapse to a universal curve with a power tail of exponent close to −4 − scale
invariance and universality; and 4) the CPDs developed herein are intuitive and easy
to compute − simplicity and parsimony.
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a) DJIA b) KO 
d). INTC c) QQQ 
Figure 3.8: The scaled CPDs of returns for some FTS for Fig. 3.2, which gives rise to a universal
curve
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T=1 day T=2 day 
T=4 day T=8 day 
T=16 day T=32 day 
Figure 3.9: The scaled CPDs of daily returns for DJIA with different time durations for Fig. 3.3
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T=5 min T=10 min 
T=30 min T=60 min 
T=120 min T=240 min 
Figure 3.10: The scaled CPDs of returns for QQQ with different time (minute) durations for
Fig. 3.4.























































































































































































































































T=1 day T=2 day 
T=4 day T=8 day 
T=16 day T=32 day 
Figure 3.11: The scaled power law tail of CPDs of (positive) daily returns for DJIA with different
time durations for Fig. 3.5.

































































































T=5 min T=10 min 
T=30 min T=60 min 
T=120 min T=240 min 
Figure 3.12: The scaled power law tail of CPDs of (positive) returns for QQQ with different
time (minute) durations for Fig. 3.6.
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3.4.4 Super universal curves of the CPDs of asset returns
Now, we examine the scaling property of the CPDs of the returns for different time
durations and across different asset series. It turns out that the scaling gives rise
to a super universal curve, for the scaled CPDs of the returns for different time
durations and for different asset series, with the power law tail index being close to
−4. Fig. 3.13 plots the CPDs of returns in different durations (of 1,2,4,8,16 and
32 days for DJIA daily data, and of 5, 10, 30, 60, 120 and 240 minutes for QQQ
5-minute data). The scaled CPDs of the returns for DJIA and QQQ all collapse to
a super universal curve with a power law tail index being close to −4.
Fig. 3.14 plots the CPDs of the returns with different time durations (1,2,4,8,16
and 32 days) for five S&P500 component stocks (BA, GM, IBM, KO and PCG).
The scaled CPDs of the returns collapse to a super universal curve with a power
law tail index being close to −4. The data collapse is not as good as in the previous
plots, but it is still rather impressive as there are hundred of curves involved.
3.5 Conclusion
We have introduced a robust quantitative measure of volatility clustering based on
conditional probability distributions (CPD) for financial asset return series. With
such measure we have revealed a few salient features of volatility clustering in finan-
cial time series.
These features include:
1. Volatility clustering can be quantitatively described by a linear dependence
function of the width of CPD on its previous return with the coefficient para-
























































































DJIA − Unscaled 
QQQ− Unscaled 
DJIA − Scaled 





Figure 3.13: The CPDs of (positive) returns for DJIA and QQQ with different time durations
(the left panel). The plots on the right are scaled by the widths of the CPDs, which give rise to a














































α = −4 
α = −4 
Unscaled Scaled
Figure 3.14: The power law tail of CPDs of (positive) returns for five S&P500 component stocks
(BA, GM, IBM, KO and PCG) with different time durations (the left panel). The plot on the
right panel is scaled by the widths of the CPDs, which gives rise to a super universal curve with a
power law tail index close to −4.
2. The CPDs give the universality of volatility clustering in FTS: when CPDs are
rescaled by their respective width they collapse to a universal curve exhibiting
a power law tail with exponent close to −4;
3. The CPDs reveal a super universality of volatility clustering in FTS: when
scaled by their respective widths, the CPDs all collapse to the same super
universal curve, irrespective of the magnitude of the previous return, the time
duration, or the underlying assets.
Thus the CPDs as a measure of volatility clustering are quite revealing. The CPD
is simple to compute and easy to use, so it can be a useful tool in empirical study.
What we found through CPDs are indeed rather universal statistical properties of
financial return time series. The question is what stochastic dynamics can give rise
to these properties? This is the topic covered in the next chapter where we shall




Time Series Modeling of Financial Assets
In this chapter we study one genre of the modeling methodologies: time series
modeling, which is a rather successful and widely used method. We review the
popular and well-studied ARCH/GARCH class model and point out some important
drawbacks of the model. We introduce a stochastic volatility model and demonstrate
that our model captures most of the essential stylized facts observed in real financial
time series (FTS) and overcomes some of the shortcomings of the GARCH model.
Both the formation of volatility clustering and the emergence of fat power law tails
in the distribution of asset return can be understood in the context of the model. In
addition, our newly found universality of the CPDs of return pervasively observed
in real FTS is also reproduced by the model. Furthermore, the model is simple,
practical, and parsimonious as two of its parameters can be directly used to control
the excess volatility and volatility clustering so that the model can accurately fit
the different FTS. The model may be used as a starting point for studying option





Modeling of financial time series (FTS) has been one of the most active research
areas in financial study ever since the pioneering work of Bachelier [8] more than
100 years ago. The behavior of financial markets has been understood more and
more comprehensively and systematically during the past 40 years after Madelbrot
[124] and Fama [60] observed excess volatility and the associated volatility cluster-
ing in financial asset returns. Nowadays, it’s a common knowledge that financial
return time series exhibit a set of general properties termed as “stylized facts”. The
facts include: excess volatility (measured by excess kurtosis), volatility clustering,
asymmetry, leverage effects and slow decaying of autocorrelation function (ACF)
of absolute/squared return etc. Empirical study shows that excess volatility and
volatility clustering are so essential and pervasive that they have become a neces-
sary requirement for any modeling of FTS.
A lot of work in time series modeling have been reported in the literature and
the most well-known is the ARCH/GARCH model [53, 18]. Although the GARCH
model enjoys tremendous success, it has some important drawbacks:
• If the GARCH model is correctly specified with one frequency of data, it will
be misspecified for data on other different time scales [57].
• Most of the stylized facts from empirical observation are dependent on sam-
pling frequency [57], however the GARCH model lacks a mechanism to take
into account this factor.
• The excess volatility and its clustering generated from the GARCH model with
the parameters estimated from empirical data are much less pronounced than
those observed in the empirical data [123].
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• the time lag dependence of excess volatility and volatility clustering of the
GARCH model is not consistent with that of real FTS.
The problem 1-2 can be partly overcome by limiting the GARCH model to the
same FTS for parameters estimation and volatility forecasting. The remedies for
drawback 3 are considering leptokurtic error distribution instead of the normal error
[29, 85, 135, 161]. The problem 4 will be our focus here and we shall give detailed
analysis of it.
Some other well-known volatility models include autoregressive stochastic volatil-
ity (ARSV) model [159] and multi-fractal (MF) model [7], etc. However, detail
discussion of these models is beyond the main scope of this thesis. Our main focus
here is on the GARCH as it is the predominant and the most widely used model in
practice.
To tackle some of the problems of the GARCH model, we introduce a phenom-
enological model (of stochastic volatility). Our model is also based on the fact that
returns are uncorrelated but the volatility is clustered in real FTS. Although it is
very simple, our model not only is able to reproduce most of the essential stylized
facts and the CPD universality we described in the previous chapter, but also over-
comes most of the shortcomings of the GARCH model. We show, both analytically
and numerically, that both the unconditional and the conditional probability distri-
bution (CPD) of the returns generated from simulation time series give the results
that are mostly consistent with that of the real FTS. In particular, its CPDs of
the returns of simulated time series give rise to correct universal curve of power
law tail with an exponent close to −4. In addition, the model can be specified
on any time scales through the model constant parameter δ0. Besides, the model
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gives correct time aggregate property of excess volatility (measured by the kurto-
sis): monotonically decreasing with the time duration of the return, exhibited in
real FTS. Furthermore, the two parameters of the model can be used to directly
control the strengths of excess volatility and volatility clustering so that the mode
can fit various strengths of volatility clustering in different market data.
In the next section, we give a brief review of the GARCH model, highlighting
its major salient features and drawbacks. Section 3 describes our model in detail
and shows that simulation results give consistent results to the real FTS. Section 4
concludes.
4.2 GARCH Model
In this section we give a brief review of the major properties of GARCH model.
While the general form of the GARCH(p,q) has more theoretical interest (see e.g.
[97, 84] wherein the moment structure of GRACH(p,q) were analyzed), we focus here
on the GARCH(1,1) representation, as it is the simplest and widely used model in
practice.
4.2.1 The model description
The ARCH/GARCH-type of model, beginning with Engle [53] and Bollerslev [18],
has become the predominant method for describing the statistical property of FTS.
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where zt are i.i.d., αi(i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , p) and βj(j = 1, 2, · · · , q) are model parameters.




ht = α0 + αy
2
t−1 + βht−1 (4.2)
4.2.2 Major impact and properties of ARCH/GARCHmodel
The significant contributions of ARCH/GARCH modeling are that it has “deepened
our understanding of two central properties of many economic time series − non-
stationarity and time-varying volatility − and have led to a large number of appli-
cations.” [112]. Since its advent, the GARCH-class model has enjoyed tremendous
success as it opened up a new research direction in characterizing the time-varying
volatility of economic time series [59]. A huge number of publications are available
in the literature. Some theoretical work on the moment structure of the GARCH
model with normal error can be found, for example, in [84, 97]. For a recent survey
on some of the extensions of the GARCH model and volatility forecasts in general
see Poon and Granger [139]. However, some analysis [123, 29] on the models show
that with normal innovation error, the (GARCH/EGARCH) models are at their
best when it comes to characterizing models based on time series with relative low
kurtosis and high first-order autocorrelation of squared returns. Some other studies
show that when it comes to describing a data generating process of real FTS, the
GARCH model with normal error fails to be a robust process for describing the
volatility over longer horizon [156]. We shall show next that the GARCH model
with normal error can have high kurtosis, but the parameters values required may
not be within the regions that are obtainable from estimation of real FTS. In addi-
tion, the property of time duration dependence of kurtosis in the GARCH model is
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not consistent with that of real FTS.
4.2.3 Property of time duration dependence of kurtosis for
GARCH model
Another angle to examine how well the GARCH model can describe the real FTS
is to study its time (aggregate) scale property of excess volatility. Thus here we are
interested in obtaining the kurtosis of returns with time duration τ , for GARCH(1,1)
































E[z2t ht] = τE[ht] (4.5)
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and



































































Here we assume zt is i.i.d. Gaussian N(0, 1), so v4 = E[z
4
t ] = 3 and v2 = E[z
2
t ] = 1.
It can be shown that E[ht] and E[h
2
t ] can be obtained as:
E[ht] =
α0
1− (α + β) (4.7)
and
E[h2t ] = α
2
0
1 + (α + β)
(1− (α + β))(1− (3α2 + 2αβ + β2)) (4.8)
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t hths] = E[z
2
t ht(α0 + αy
2
s−1 + βhs−1)]
= E[z2t ht(α0 + (αz
2
s−1 + β)hs−1)]
= E[z2t ht{α0 + (αz2s−1 + β)(α0 + αz2s−2 + β)hs−2...}]
= E[α0z
2
t ht{1 + (αz2s−1 + β) + (αz2s−1 + β)(αz2s−2 + β) + ... + (αz2s−1 + β)...
(αz2t+1 + β)}] + E[(αz2s−1 + β)...(αz2t + β)z2t h2t ]
= α0E[z
2
t ]E[ht]{1 + (α+ β) + (α + β)(α+ β) + ...+ (α + β)...(α + β)}















= α0[1 + γ1 + γ
2
1 + ... + γ
s−t−1












where γ1 = α + β. Substituting the above equality into Eq.(4.6) we have:
E[y4τ ] = 3τE[h
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(1−γ1)2 if τ ≥ 2
(4.12)
and γ1 = α + β, γ2 = 2α












(1−γ1)2(1−γ2) if τ ≥ 2
(4.13)
It’s easy to show that: Kτ
τ→∞
= 3, which agrees with the empirical observations.
However, it is also easy to show that the Kτ is not a monotonic decreasing function
of the variable τ , which is not consistent with the empirical observations on real
FTS where the kurtosis is a monotonic decaying function of the time lag τ of the
return.
Depending on the parameter value of α and β, the kurtosis Kτ reaches the maxi-
mum at certain time lag τc and then monotonically decays to reach 3 when τ →∞.
However the analytical solution for such critical point of time lag from Eqn.(4.11) is
not possible to obtain; only numerical solutions can be found. We show such critical
points in Fig. 4.1.
From these plots we can see that for a high kurtosis value that is consistent with
real FTS, the GARCH model requires a very high value for α and γ2, which is
rarely obtainable from the parameter estimation on real FTS. We shall show in
the next subsection that this is indeed the case (we also compare the analytical
result obtained here with that of real FTS and that of the GARCH simulation with
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a). 2α2+(α+β)2=0.97 b). 2α2+(α+β)2=0.98 
c). 2α2+(α+β)2=0.99 d). 2α2+(α+β)2=0.995 
Figure 4.1: The dependence of the kurtosis of the GARCH(1,1) model (with normal error) on
its time duration (time step τ).
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a). Real FTS b). Garch simulation 
Figure 4.2: The dependence of the kurtosis on its time lag for real daily FTS and GARCH
simulation series. In panel a) the curves are the kurtosis computed from real FTS; and in panel
b) the curve is obtained by averaging over 1000 simulations for each set of parameters estimated
from the real FTS.
parameters estimated from real FTS).
4.2.4 Time duration dependence of kurtosis of real FTS and
GARCH simulation
Fig. 4.2 shows the time lag dependence properties of kurtosis computed from a few
real FTS (BA, GM, IBM, KO, PCG, and DJIA) and from the simulation series of
the GARCH model with parameters estimated from these real FTS. The FTS data
used in the figure are daily series of five SP500 component stocks (1962-01 to 2004-
12) and DJIA (1886-05 to 1999-07). There are 10700 prices for these five SP500
stocks and 28,400 prices for DJIA. In panel a) the kurtosis is computed directly
from the real FTS; curves in panel b) were obtained from the simulation time series
from the GARCH model with the parameters estimated from the respective real
FTS.
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The Table 4.1 displays GARCH parameters estimated using real FTS (BA, GM,
IBM, KO, PCG and DJIA), their kurtosises, Kg, analytically calculated from the
GARCH model with Gaussian error, and kurtosises, Ks, computed from the samples
of the data. For each FTS, four sub-segments are used for estimating/computing
of the GARCH parameters and kurtosises: “FH” − uses the first half of the data;
“MH” − the middle half; “SH” − the second half; and “All” − all samples of the
data. The parameter estimation is done using variance-targeting technique [55],
which sets the long-run variance rate to the sample variance computed from the real
FTS data. The maximum likelihood estimation is used with Levenberg-Marquardt
algorithm [142] for the GARCH parameter estimation; this gives robust estimation
results.
We have the following observations from Fig. 4.1, 4.2, and Table 4.1. Firstly,
comparing the time lag dependence of the kurtosis of the GARCH model obtained
from our theoretical analysis (in Fig. 4.1) and the ones obtained from simulation (in
Fig. 4.2), we see that they are in good agreement. Secondly, the time lag dependence
of kurtosis from the GARCH model is very different from that of real FTS: 1) the
one-day kurtosis values of the GARCH model are much lower than those of real
FTS. This can be seen clearly from the results listed in the Table by comparing
the analytical values of kurtosis, Kg, (calculated from the GARCH model), and the
values of kurtosis, Ks, (computed directly from the samples of the real FTS); 2) For
real FTS, the maximum kurtosis is at time duration τ = 1 and it is a monotonic
decaying function of time duration; however for the GARCH model, the maximum
kurtosis is at τc (>1). Thirdly, the GARCH parameters estimated from real FTS
usually have low value for α so that the simulation time series from the model cannot
produce high kurtosis that is pervasively observed in real FTS. This suggests that
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Table 4.1: The parameters and kurtosis estimated from the GARCH model and
kurtosis computed from FTS for SP500 stocks and DJIA
Params BA-FH GM-FH IBM-FH KO-FH PCG-FH DJIA-FH
α 0.0692 0.0676 0.0705 0.0585 0.0505 0.1066
β 0.8972 0.9089 0.9091 0.9243 0.9359 0.8774
Kg 3.5095 3.7357 3.9758 3.7533 3.7010 10.6574
Ks 6.2451 6.2178 5.5578 7.8173 6.0287 29.2248
Params BA-MH GM-MH IBM-MH KO-MH PCG-MH DJIA-MH
α 0.0592 0.0697 0.0667 0.0696 0.0677 0.0940
β 0.9149 0.9109 0.9153 0.9086 0.9090 0.8942
Kg 3.4770 4.0174 3.9964 3.8727 3.7417 12.0548
Ks 5.7421 11.9171 21.6480 24.9008 15.9559 19.6667
Params BA-SH GM-SH IBM-SH KO-SH PCG-SH DJIA-SH
α 0.0658 0.0796 0.0787 0.0797 0.1210 0.0761
β 0.9096 0.8941 0.9051 0.8973 0.8630 0.9071
Kg 3.6496 3.9651 4.8940 4.1707 40.1273 4.5875
Ks 10.5093 11.0201 15.9703 22.7663 94.6299 64.5647
Params BA-ALL GM-ALL IBM-ALL KO-ALL PCG-ALL DJIA-ALL
α 0.0667 0.0686 0.0701 0.0648 0.0790 0.0894
β 0.9044 0.9152 0.9161 0.9178 0.9094 0.8964
Kg 3.5554 4.2399 4.6894 3.9599 6.5671 6.9226
Ks 7.7889 11.1959 15.6355 18.6094 113.6408 40.2374
when it comes to characterizing the time duration dependence of excess volatility
for time series with long time horizons, the GARCH model (with normal error) is
not a valid choice, and thus an alternative should be sought.
4.2.5 Summary
In this subsection we studied the time duration dependence property of the GARCH
model and examined its parameters estimation and model simulation. Both the
analytical and numerical results show that when it comes to describing the time
duration dependence of excess volatility of returns, GARCH(1,1) model produces
quite different property from that of real FTS. From the analytical result we obtained
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for the time aggregate function of kurtosis in Eqn. (4.11), we can see that, to obtain
a high value of K1 to be consistent with real FTS, requires a large α and a value of
γ2(= 2α
2 + (α + β)2) very close to unity. The parameters estimated from real FTS
rarely meet these two criteria simultaneously. This is clearly shown in the results of
model simulation with parameters estimated from real FTS (see the Table 4.1). This
shortcoming of the GARCH model has not been well documented yet. Since the
time-duration dependence property of excess volatility is very important, especially
for those financial derivatives products, the GARCH model is not appropriate for
financial applications that depend on such property.
4.3 A Phenomenological Model of Volatility Clus-
tering
In this section, we propose and study a simple stochastic volatility model. The
model is developed from the earlier model discussed by Chen and Jayaprakash [32].
We will mainly focus on the discrete version of the model and the continuum version
will be discussed briefly.
4.3.1 The model dynamics
The dynamics of the model is described by the following expression:
X(t+ 1) = X(t) + δ(t)z(t), (4.14)
where X(t) is the logarithm of the stock price, z(t) is a Gaussian random variable
with zero mean and unit variance, and δ(t) is a time-dependent volatility variable:
δ(t) = δ0γ
n(t). Here δ0 is a model constant which depends on the time scale of
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the model, γ(> 1) is a model parameter, and n(t) a non-negative integer which is
updated probabilistically according to P (n→ n+1) = p and P (n→ n− 1) = 1− p
(p < 0.5). The change in the variable n is independent of the change in X(t). We
enforce the condition 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ nmax; thus δ0 is the minimum of δ(t) and γnmax
(= δ0γ
nmax) is the maximum volatility. The strength of volatility clustering and
the dynamics are jointly determined by parameter γ and p. Note that for the time
scales we are considering here we ignore the intrinsic growth rate as it is negligible
compared to the volatility 1.
4.3.2 Analytical properties of the model
Let us obtain the steady-state probability distribution of n. The Master equations
for the probability distribution of n can be written as:
P (0) = (1− p)P (0) + (1− p)P (1)
P (n) = pP (n− 1) + (1− p)P (n+ 1), n ≥ 1. (4.15)
It is easy to obtain P (n) = P (0)e−λn, where λ = ln 1−p
p
. If we set p = 1
1+γ2
, we
will have λ = 2 ln γ. From the normalization condition
∫ nmax
0
P (n)dn = 1 we get
P (0) ∼ λ when nmax → ∞, so we arrive at P (n) = λe−λn. It is easy to show that
the distribution of δ(t) is then given by a power-law, P (δ) ∼ δ−λ/ ln γ−1. This way of
generating power-law distribution was first noted by Herbert Simon [154] in 1955.
Given that P (δ) is a power law, with some algebra we can show that there is also
a power law tail in the probability distribution of the return r = X(t + T ) − X(t)
over a given time period T . It should be noted, however, that a long (or multi-step)
1For example, an average daily stock volatility is about 1%, but a daily interest rate is only
about 0.014% for an annual interest rate of 5%
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simulation is needed to sample the large values of n in order to obtain a reliable and
stable distribution at the tail. We found that the conditional probability distribution
PT (r|rp), where r = X(t + T ) − X(t) and rp = X(t) − X(t − T ), is quite stable
— perhaps due to the fact that the conditional probability depends mostly on the
distribution of the difference in n (∆n). We will show shortly that, if we choose
p = 1/(1 + γ2), the tail in the conditional probability will be characterized by a
power law with the exponent equal to −4, agreeing with the result obtained for the
real data presented in the previous chapter.
Many features of the conditional probability generated from the model can be
understood analytically, and we hope this will provide an insight into the stochastic
process governing the asset price fluctuation. To start with the analysis, let us write








Here {zj} are independent Gaussian random variables and σj = γnj . For simplicity
we set the unit time step to be 1. It is clear that the dependence of r on rp is
through their dependences on σ(t) = σ or n(t). Thus we can write,
P (r|rp) = 1
Pp(∆Sp)
∫
dσ P (r|σ)P (rp|σ)Q(σ). (4.17)
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where the double brackets indicate averaging over {zj, σj} from j = t to t + T − 1
with σt = σ fixed. The Gaussian integrals over {zj} can be done trivially using
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The remaining average over the {σj} with σt = σ fixed becomes an average over
the distribution of U and Up with σ fixed. Upon substitution of the above results
into Equation(4.17) we obtain



















2Up P (U |σ)P (Up|σ)Q(σ)
(4.21)
Using an argument of detailed balance (P (n)P (n→ n′) = P (n′)P (n′ → n)), we can
show that, in the steady state, the functional form of P (U | σ) and P (Up | σ) are
the same functions; this justifies the use of the degenerate notation.




γnj−n ≡ σY, (4.22)
where n = n(t) and σ = σ(t) = σ0γ
n. When n is large, Y is essentially independent
of n if T (1−2p) n, as the probability that n reaches the reflecting barrier n = 0 is
small during the interval of length T . Let us consider the case of large r > σc, where
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σc = σ0γ
T (1−2p). From the expression of P (r|rp), the contribution to the integral
coming from U  r2 can be neglected. So we only need to consider the case of
relatively large U > σ2c . In this regime Y is independent of σ, and we have:





















2UpP (Y )P (Up|σ)Q(σ)
(4.23)
Now we can rescale σ by σ′ = σ/r. Given the fact that Q(σ) ∼ 1/σ3, it is easy to
see P (r|rp) ∝ 1/r4; thus the conditional probability distribution exhibits a power
law tail (when r > σc) with exponent equal to −4.
When r > σc and rp > σc, both Y and Yp are independent of σ. In this limit we
have:





















2σYpP (Y )P (Yp)Q(σ)
(4.24)
Given that, Q(σ) ∼ σ−3 and P (rp) ∼ r−3p , we can again easily see that P (r|αrp) =
αP (r/α|rp). Thus the conditional probability distributions for different rp collapse
to a universal curve upon rescaling; the rescaling factor is simply proportional to
rp, as we have observed from the real data and from the model data when rp is
not too small. For the case of small rp < σc, P (r|rp) still exhibits the power law
tail with the same exponent. It is not surprising that numerically the data collapse
actually extends to the cases with small values of rp. The scaling factor, however,
depends little on rp at small rp, reflecting the fact (as can be seen from Eqn 4.21)
that the dependence of P (r|rp) on rp is very weak at small rp. Overall our analysis
shows that the model captures the most important features of volatility clustering,
as reflected in conditional probability distributions.















































Figure 4.3: The CPDs of returns from the model with γ = 1.02 and T = 5. There are 14
CPDs, each corresponding to different value of rp. The tails of CPDs are described by a power law
with the exponent equal to −4 (the left panel). When scaled by a scale factor w(r|rp), the CPDs
collapse to a universal curve (the right panel).
4.3.3 Simulation results of the model
Fig. 4.3 shows the CPDs of returns generated from the model with γ = 1.02 for
T = 5. The tails of the CPDs of returns are well described by a power law with
the exponent equal to −4. When the CPDs are scaled by their own scale factors,
w(r|rp), they collapse to a universal curve. The simulation results are in excellent
agreement with the analytical results and are consistent with that of real FTS. This
suggests that our model indeed captures the most essential features of FTS and that
our CPD measure provides an excellent tool in characterizing the universal feature
of volatility clustering in FTS.
To examine its robustness of the scaling against different time steps we plot Fig.
4.4. The scale factor w(r|rp) vs rp for different T from the model with γ = 1.02 is
plotted in Fig. 4.5.
























































Figure 4.4: The CPDs of returns from the model with γ = 1.02 and T = 1, 2, 5, 20, 40, 100, of
which the tails are all described by a power law with the exponent equal to −4 (the left panel).
There are 14 CPDs each corresponding to different value of rp for each T . All the CPDs from
different rp and for different time durations collapse to a super universal curve when they are scaled
by their respective scale factor, w(r|rp). (the right panel)
















Figure 4.5: The scale factor w(r|rp) vs rp for different T from the model with γ = 1.02.
4.3 A Phenomenological Model of Volatility Clustering 99
As can be seen from the figures, most important features of the conditional prob-
ability distributions (CPDs) are reproduced in the model. Fig. 4.4 clearly shows
a scaling property of the CPDs: 1) For a wide range of time durations the CPDs
are linearly correlated with their previous volatility (absolute return); and 2) such
linear correlation can be described quantitatively to produce a super universal curve
for the CPDs of returns with different rp and different time duration, when they are
rescaled by their respective scale factor, w(r|rp). From Fig. 4.5 we can see that:
1) for large returns, the width of the current return, w(r|rp), is approximately lin-
early dependent on its previous (absolute) return; 2) the smaller the time step, the
more pronounced the linear dependency, thus the stronger the volatility clustering.
Note that since the time steps are not large enough, we can only see the trend of
crossover to Gaussian behavior when the time step increases. We shall show next
that for large time steps the cross-over to Gaussian is apparent.
4.3.4 Duration of Volatility Clustering
To see the time scales for volatility clustering of the model, we need to consider
relatively large γ. The crossover from the volatility clustering regime to the non-
clustering regime can be seen from a set of plots of w(r|rp) vs rp for different T . Fig.
4.6 shows clearly that for γ = 1.2, there is a crossover when T  25. Recall that
the power law tail exists for r > σc, where σc = σ0γ
(T/δt)(1−2p) and p = 1/(1 + γ2
(here we have put back the time unit δt). Now define Tc = δt
γ2+1
(γ2−1) ln(γ) , then
σc = σ0 exp(T/Tc). Because σc grows exponentially for T  Tc (for γ = 1.2,
Tc ≈ 30), Tc can be taken as the crossover time. The volatility clustering gradually
disappears for T > Tc. For real data, we don’t have enough statistics to clearly show
the crossover, although the trend of crossover to non-clustering regime is present in
the DJIA and in QQQ, as shown in Fig. 3.7.
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Figure 4.6: The scale factor w(r|rp) vs rp for different T from the model with γ = 1.2.
4.3.5 Continuous-time model
To further understand the scaling in time, we need to consider how the continuum
limit of the model is constructed. First of all, as δt→ 0, we need to fix γ = 1+γa
√
δt,















δt σ δn = (−γ2a δt+ 0.5dz)σ ,
where dz is a zero-mean random number with < dz2 >= δt.
So the continuum limit model is:
dS = rSdt+ σSdzS (4.25)
dσ = σ(−γ2adt+ 0.5dz) (4.26)
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The constraint in δ is δ > 0. As long as T > δt, the statistics of the stochastic
dynamics should not depend on δt. From our analysis of the Dow Jones Index, the
volatility clustering is of the order of one or two months. Given Tc = 1/γ
2
a, γa should
be around 0.01 (we use a minute as the unit here). γ used for the discrete model
depends on the basic time step used. If the time step is four minutes, then γ ∼ 1.02;
and if the time step is one day, then we should use γ ∼ 1.2. With this identification
of the dependence of the model parameters on δt, we can conveniently simulate the
asset dynamics on different time scales.
4.3.6 Time duration dependence of excess volatility
Now we examine the property of time duration dependence of excess volatility of
the model, measured by the kurtosis. Fig. 4.7 − 4.9 plot time duration dependence
curves of kurtosis on returns generated by the model. Since our model simulates
microscopic dynamics of asset price, it’s natural to generate daily price series with
multi-steps, i.e. to generate the daily price time series with multiple (smaller time
scale) samples. In Fig. 4.7 − 4.9, daily price is sampled by 21, 42, 84, and 168
high-frequency samples. We assume a seven-hour daily trading session as is for the
DJIA, thus, 21 samples a day corresponds to a process with 20 minute time step,
and 42 samples a day corresponds to a process with 10 minute time step, and so on.
We can see from the plots that with a proper choice of the parameters the model
gives an excellent description of the real FTS in its time duration dependence prop-
erty of volatility! This can be seen from comparing the kurtosis curves of γ = 1.18
in panel b) and of γ = 1.10 in panel c) in Fig. 4.8 to the curve for DJIA in the
panel a) of Fig. 4.2. This suggests that the model also captures the key features of
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a). 21 samples/day b). 42 samples/day 
c). 84 samples/day d). 168 samples/day 
Figure 4.7: The curve showing the dependence of the kurtosis of returns on its time lag generated
from model simulations; Each curve is obtained by averaging over 1,000 runs and each run generates
28400 daily price samples, similar in size to that of DJIA. The model parameters used are: γnmax
=20, δ0 =0.005 (which gives a daily average volatility similar to that of DJIA).
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a). 21 samples/day b). 42 samples/day 
c). 84 samples/day d). 168 samples/day 
Figure 4.8: The curve showing the dependence of kurtosis of returns on its time lag generated
from model simulations; All the parameters are the same as used in Fig. 4.7, except here γnmax =
30 is used
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a) 21 samples/day b) 42 samples/day 
c) 84 samples/day d) 168 samples/day 
Figure 4.9: The curve showing the dependence of kurtosis of returns on its time lag generated
from model simulations; All the parameters are the same as used in Fig. 4.7, except here γnmax =
40 is used
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the asset price dynamics in its time duration dependence property of volatility.
These figures also illustrate the impact of the model parameters on the simulation
of price dynamics: 1) the upper bound of time-dependent volatility factor measured
by γnmax determines the overall excess volatility, the larger the factor, the larger
the excess volatility; 2) parameter γ determines the correlation of the volatility
dynamics, the smaller the value, the stronger the correlation, and vice versa; 3)
the number of time steps within the return period also has impact on the volatility
dynamics, the smaller the number, the stronger the correlation in excess volatility.
With these observations and a proper choice of the parameters, one can fit the
model to all different real FTS. This may provide a good starting point to study
derivatives pricing.
4.3.7 Summary
We have introduced a simple phenomenological, stochastic volatility model, and we
studied it both analytically and numerically. The dynamic mechanism of both the
formation of volatility and the emergence of volatility clustering can be understood
through the model. We show that the model captures most of the essential stylized
facts and the universality of CPDs observed in real FTS. In addition, the model
overcomes a number of shortcomings of the GARCH(1,1) model, especially its time
duration dependence property of excess volatility and gives a rich structure of time
duration dependence of kurtosis. Furthermore, the model is flexible in fitting FTS
with different long-term volatilities (via the parameter δ0) and various strengths of
volatility clustering (via fitting the parameter γnmax and multiple steps of sampling
of microscopic dynamics of the model). The model is intuitive as the parameters
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carry clear practical meanings and the number of parameters are parsimonious yet
they are sufficient to give the model enough flexibility to fit all different real FTS.
A continuum version of the model is also constructed. We believe that the contin-
uum model provides a sound basis for studying option pricing, which traditionally
relies on the assumption of a random Gaussian process for asset price movement in
conjunction with empirical implied volatility correction.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored time series modeling of FTS with two major focuses:
1) study of the GARCH model and 2) exploring an alternative time series modeling.
In the study of the GARCH model, we have done a detailed analysis, both ana-
lytically and numerically, producing a few new observations.
• Our theoretical analysis on the time duration property of kurtosis of the
GARCH model is consistent to that of numerical results.
• The time duration dependence property of kurtosis of the GARCH model is
inconsistent to that of real FTS; In real FTS, one-period kurtosis is usually
very high (>> 3) and the kurtosis monotonically decays with the time duration
(of the return). In GARCH, however, one-period kurtosis is lower and the
kurtosis increases with the time duration, at first, reaches a peak at certain
time step τc, and then decreases monotonically.
• Although analytical GARCH model can produce a high kurtosis observed in
real FTS, the required parameter values can hardly be obtainable from the
parameter estimation using real FTS.
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From these observations, we have the conclusions for the GARCH model as follows.
• The GARCH(1,1) model (with a normal error distribution) fails to describe
high excess volatility in real FTS;
• The GARCH generate incorrect time scaling property of excess volatility;
• Therefore, when both a high kurtosis and a correct time duration dependence
of kurtosis are required, the GARCH(1,1) model is not a valid choice, and a
better alternative should be sought.
To overcome some of the shortcomings of the GARCH model, we have introduced
a simple phenomenological model (with stochastic volatility) and studied it both
analytically and numerically. The key advantages of our model can be summarized
as follows.
• Based upon the two essential facts that returns are uncorrelated but the volatil-
ity is clustered in real FTS, the model clearly demonstrates the mechanism of
the emergence of scaling, clustering and dynamics of the volatility in FTS.
• Although very simple, the model is able to reproduce most of the essential
stylized facts and the CPD universality exhibited in the real FTS. In particular,
its unconditional return distribution of simulated time series is in quite good
agreement with that of real FTS and its CPDs of the returns give rise to the
universal curve exhibiting power law tail with an index close to −4; this is also
consistent with real FTS.
• The three parameters in the model gives the desired parsimony and sufficient
flexibility to fit different FTS: 1) the time scale of the model can be specified
through the parameter δ0, (overcoming the time scale issues in the GARCH
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model); 2) the strength of volatility clustering can be controlled via parameter
γ (to fit different FTS with different volatility clustering); and 3) maximum
volatility can be set though parameter γnmax .
• In addition, the model (with a proper choice of parameters) can produce high
volatility clustering that is consistent with that of real FTS and gives cor-
rect time duration dependence property of excess volatility: monotonically
decreasing with time duration of return, exhibited in the return of real FTS.
• Thus when it comes to describing the dynamics of FTS, the model is a viable
alternative as it gives a relatively robust description for all the known key
properties of FTS.
• Traditionally option pricing is based on the inadequate assumption of an ide-
alized Gaussian process with a so-called (constant) implied volatility which is
“derived” from an inversion of option price using Black-Scholes formulas [15];
Such implied volatility depends both on the maturity and the strike price of
the option, making it “ad-hoc” in nature. Therefore a better model is required
for studying option pricing and we believe that our continuum model provides
a sound starting basis for such a task as the model gives excellent description
of the key properties of excess volatility and volatility clustering of real FTS.
Chapter 5
Modeling Volatility Clustering with an
Agent-Based Model
In this chapter we apply agent-based model to understand the underlying mechanism
for the emergence of the stylized facts in financial time series (FTS) from the per-
spective of agent’s behavior. In particular, we investigate the impact of investor’s
varying risk aversion on the dynamics of asset price fluctuations and associated
volatility clustering.
While the investors’ responses to price changes and their price forecasts are well
recognized major factors contributing to large price fluctuations in financial markets,
our study shows that investors’ heterogeneous and dynamic risk aversion (DRA)
preferences may play a more critical role in the dynamics of asset price fluctua-
tions. We propose and study a model of an artificial stock market consisting of
heterogeneous agents with DRA, and we find that DRA is the main driving force for
excess price fluctuations and the associated volatility clustering. We employ a pop-
ular power utility function, U(c, γ) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ with agent specific and time-dependent
risk aversion index, γi(t), and we derive an approximate formula for the demand
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function and aggregate price setting equation. The dynamics of each agent’s risk
aversion index, γi(t) (i=1,2,...,N), is modeled by a bounded random walk with a
constant variance δ2. We show numerically that our model reproduces most of the
“stylized” facts observed in the real data, suggesting that dynamic risk aversion is
a key mechanism for the emergence of these stylized facts.
We have tested the robustness of the impact of investor’s DRA on price fluctu-
ations with some other agent-based models and obtained similar results; thus the
impact of DRA we introduced here is rather generic. The strength of the excess
volatility and the associated volatility clustering is essentially controlled by the pa-
rameter δ, which can be used as a key market sentiment parameter. We suggest to
use the parameter δ – in conjunction with the other market indicators such as the
average return r and the average volatility σ0 – as a standard parameter characteriz-
ing the markets. Our results presented here provide new insights into the dynamics
of asset price fluctuations governed by investors’ fluctuating sentiments.
5.1 Introduction
It remains a great challenge, due the inherent complexity of the financial market,
to develop a parsimonious market model that can reproduce all key “stylized” facts
observed in real financial data and provide insights into the market mechanism for
the emergence of these stylized facts. One of the promising approaches is agent-
based modeling, which has reproduced and explained the emergence of some of
the “stylized” facts. The agent-based modeling provides an ideal framework for
investigating the impact of investors’ behavior on the price dynamics from many
different perspectives; it has become an indispensable tool for understanding the
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price dynamics of financial markets [114]. With agent-based modeling, one can
model and investigate, for example, how investors make their price forecasts and how
their price forecasts influence the price fluctuation [6, 45, 117], how investors respond
to price change [122, 27], and how investors form and change their market beliefs
[23, 12]. Here we use agent-based models to study how investors’ fluctuating risk
preferences (in response to changing market conditions) affect the price dynamics.
This important issue has not been fully explored.
Financial markets present many important and challenging problems. We have
discussed these problems in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we focus our attention to ex-
plore what is the underlying mechanism of investors’ behavior that results in scaling,
clustering and dynamics of volatility in the resultant FTS. Here we are particularly
interested in how agents’ dynamic risk aversion (DRA) behavior affects the system
dynamics. We investigate this problem by introducing DRA and incorporating it
into the framework of agent-based modeling (ABM). There are many issues to be
addressed, but the most critical issues are:
1. How to describe DRA and model it properly in the ABM framework.
2. How to derive a price setting formula under a popular power utility function;
The two issues represent both methodological and technical challenges of the prob-
lem and we address them by applying the most appropriate approach accordingly.
We outline here our model of interacting heterogeneous agents. We first consider
a baseline model, in which the agents use past price information to form their sets
of future price expectations. The agents are adaptive as their price expectations are
not based on one particular estimator but are determined by their best-performance
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estimators which may change from time to time. The agents also use their erroneous
stochastic beliefs [45] in the market to make price adjustment on their best forecasts,
which are assumed to be normally distributed. In our baseline model, we assume
that the agents have a decreasing absolute (DA), but constant relative (CR), risk
aversion (RA) (i.e. DARA and CRRA) utility function, U(c) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ . The existing
agent based models of stock market, such as the Santa Fe artificial stock market
model, typically use constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, U(c) =
−e−λc, for the price setting equation can be easily derived under such utility. As the
focus of our paper is on risk aversion, we choose to use the well accepted (DARA)
power utility function. Although a simple analytic formula for the demand function
under this utility is not available, we have derived a general functional form and a
rather good approximation for the demand function. Like the Santa Fe Institute
(SFI) market model, our baseline model market with a choice of the parameters
corresponding to the normal market conditions, exhibits some excess volatility, but
not to the extent of the volatility exhibited in real markets. In addition, there is
little enhancement of volatility clustering at high volatility regime, which is observed
in real market data [35].
By simply allowing investors to change their risk aversion attitudes, we obtain
excess volatility and volatility clustering in very good agreement with real market
data. The implication is clear: dynamic risk aversion (DRA) (instead of fixed con-
stant risk aversion) is directly responsible for excess volatility and the associated
clustering. Specifically, in our DRA model, which is built from our baseline model,
all agents have the power utility functions ( c
1−γ−1
1−γ ) but with different and time vary-
ing risk aversion indices (degrees), γi(t), which we assume to follow an independent
bounded random walk with a variance δ2. We will show that the magnitude of excess
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volatility is directly related to δ2. With such DRA, our model market exhibits most
of the important statistical characterization of real financial data, such as the “styl-
ized” facts related to excess volatility [124, 60, 20, 125, 39] and volatility clustering
[124, 61, 53, 9, 37, 146, 140, 35].
We have also studied the impacts of the dynamic risk aversion on the market
dynamics using a few other baseline models, including the SFI market model, and
we found similar results. This suggests that our results on dynamic risk aversion
are rather generic.
The next section contains a derivation of the price equation under the power
utility function for risk aversion. Section 5.3 describes our baseline model with a
fixed constant risk aversion. Section 5.4 introduces our DRA model. Section 5.5
describes the results from numerical simulations of our model. Section 5.6 considers
a DRA model built with the SFI market model as the baseline model. The last
section concludes.
5.2 Demand and Price Setting under the Power
Utility Function
5.2.1 Demand and price setting with consumption-based
model
We consider a market of N heterogeneous agents who form their subjective expec-
tations inductively and independently based on their investment strategies. There
are two assets, a risky stock paying a stochastic dividend with a limited supply of N
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shares1, and a risk-free bond paying a constant interest rate, r, with infinite supply.





they have their own time-dependent risk aversion indices denoted by γi,t. At each
time step t, every agent decides how to allocate his wealth between the risk-free
bond and the risky stock. Since the values for both the dividend payment and the
stock price at the next period t+1 are unknown random variables, the investor can
only estimate the probability of various outcomes. Assume each agent’s estimation
at time t of the next step’s price and dividend is normally distributed with the (con-
ditional) mean and variance, Ei,t[pt+1 + dt+1] and σ
2
i,t(i = 1, 2, ...N) respectively. It
can be shown, by optimizing the total utility, that the demand of agent i for holding
the share of the risky stock is approximately,
Di,t =
Ei,t[pt+1 + dt+1]− pt(1 + r)
γi,tσ2i,tpt(1 + r)
, (5.1)
where pt is the stock price at time t, γi,t is agent i’s index (degree) of risk aversion,
and σ2i,t the variance of estimation error.




i Di,t = N can be used to deter-
mine the current market price and relate the price at time t + τ , pt+τ to the price






















−∑Ni 1γi,tσ2i,t pt. (5.3)
It can be seen from the demand and price equation that the degree of the agent’s
1In practice the number of shares is never the same as the number of agents; here we set the
two numbers the same for the sake of convenience and doing so does not affect the results
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risk aversion plays an important role.
5.2.2 Derivation of demand and price equations
We now show the derivation of the above equations. Assume at time t agent i’s
consumption is ci,t, and he invests a portion x of his current consumption in the
risky asset. His total utility function defined over the current and future values of
consumption is:




where the consumption at time t+ 1 can be written as
ci,t+1(x) = ci,t[(1− x)Rf + xR˜i,t+1]. (5.5)
Here Rf = 1+ r is the gross risk-free return and R˜i,t+1 the gross return on the risky
asset. Agent i determines the amount of his investment on the risky asset, x by




Et[U(ci,t, γi,t) + U(
ci,t+1(x)
Rf






The last equality follows because the utility U(ci,t, γi,t) is known at time t and it
does not contain x.





1− γi,t . (5.7)
Substituting Eqn (5.5) into Eqn (5.7) and then inserting it back to Eqn (5.6), the
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is the present (discounted) value of the net return. Assuming
that agent i’s prediction errors of r˜i,t+1 are normally distributed:
r˜i,t+1 = E(r˜i,t+1) + zi,t = r
e
i + zi,t, (5.9)
where rei = E(r˜i,t+1) is the expected net return and the estimation error term is
zi,t ∼ N(0, σ2i ). The maximization becomes:
max
x











i f(zi; x, γi,t)dzi}, (5.10)
where f(zi; x, γi,t) = (1 + xr
e
i + xzi)
1−γi,t . In writing down the above equation we
implicitly assumed (1 + xrei + xzi) > 0, which is a necessary requirement for the










2σizi; x, γi,t)dzi. (5.11)
This Gaussian integral cannot be evaluated analytically, but it can be approximated
















k ; x, γi,t), (5.12)
where λ
(n)
k (k = 1, 2, ..., n) are the coefficients of the summation, and ξ
(n)
k are the
roots of nth Hermite polynomial H(n)(ξ). Performing the maximization by setting
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k ) = 0. (5.13)
Since |rei |  1, ξ(n)k ∼ N(1), and σi  1 for the typical time step of one day or













k ] = 0. (5.14)









−√2ξ(2)2 (= 1), the demand of agent i of risky stock can then be obtained as
Di,t = xi =
rei
γi,t[(rei )






E(pt+1 + dt+1)− (1 + r)pt
γi,tσ2i (1 + r)pt
, (5.15)
which is the Eqn. (5.1). In writing down the above approximation we assume
(rei )
2  σ2i , which is certainly true when the time step is one day or shorter.
To get a more accurate approximation of the demand function, higher order Hermite
polynomial roots are needed in the summation approximation to the integral in Eqn.
(5.11). It can be shown that, the demand function xi in a higher order approximation
is exactly the same as in Eqn. (5.15), except for an overall constant factor.
5.3 The Baseline Model
5.3.1 Price prediction
To use the demand and price setting function derived in the previous section, one
still needs to incorporate each agent’s prediction of the payoff at the next time
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step, Et(pt+1 + dt+1). We assume all agents use the past price information for price
forecasting. The simplest way is to calculate a moving average of the available past
prices and use it as a proxy of price forecasting for the next time step t + 1. Since
investors may have different investment horizons and evaluation strategies, they may
use different time lags for their calculation of the moving average of past prices. We
consider each agent to have his own M sets of predictors so that he can choose
the best one at each time for forecasting the price at the next time step. Each
price predictor Ei,j(pt+1 + dt+1), (i = 1, 2, ..., N ; j = 1, 2, ...,M) is made of a moving
average of past Li,j prices with a subjective erroneous stochastic adjustment:





(pt + dt) + εi,j (5.16)
where εi,j ∼ N(0, σp+d) is Gaussian random variable.
The variance of the estimation error, σ2i,t, is assumed to update with a moving
average of the squared forecast error:
σ2i,j,t = (1− θ)σ2i,j,t−1 + θ[(pt+1 + dt+1)− Ei,j,t[pt+1 + dt+1]]2, (5.17)
where θ (0 < θ  1) is a weighting constant.
5.3.2 Dividend process
The dividend process is assumed to be a random walk:
dt = dt−1 + rd + t, (5.18)
where t is an i.i.d. Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance σd; rd is the
average dividend growth rate. Note that the dividend process in a real stock market
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may be more complicated than what we assumed here and it may vary from stock
to stock. However, our results are not sensitive to the choice of dividend process.
5.3.3 The price setting equation of the baseline model
For homogeneous agents with fixed constant risk aversion, the demand function (5.1)
and the price setting Eqn. (5.2) can be simplified to
Di,t =
















From the above equations one can see that the risk aversion index γ only affects
the overall level of demand but not its fluctuations. It also does not contribute
to price fluctuations. Thus in the case of homogeneous and constant risk averse
agents, the main source of the price fluctuations is from the investors’ price fore-
casting. The baseline model does not incorporate investor’s changing sentiment.
As a consequence, the price fluctuation is expected to be very limited and we will
subsequently show that this is indeed the case.
5.4 Model with Dynamic Risk Aversion
5.4.1 Heterogeneous and dynamic risk averse agents
To extend the baseline model with constant risk aversion index γ, we allow agents
to have heterogeneous risk aversion indices (degrees), which vary with time. This
reflects the fact that, in real financial markets, different investors have different risk
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attitudes and the investor’s sentiment changes with time. We assume that the risk
aversion index of each agent follows an independent bounded random walk with a
constant variance δ2:
γi,t = γi,t−1[1 + δzt] γi,t ∈ [γ0, γu] (5.21)
where zt is an i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with mean zero and unit variance,
γ0(> 0) is the lower bound, and γu(> γ0) the upper bound. It is easy to relate the








5.4.2 Price equation with dynamic risk aversion












Comparing Eqn. (5.23) with the case of constant risk aversion we see that there is an





τδ  1, pt+τ and pt can differ by a large factor. This contributes
to large fluctuations in price. Our numerical results, presented in the next session,
clearly show that it is this risk aversion dynamics that gives rise to the excessive
price fluctuations and the associated volatility clustering.
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5.4.3 The range of DRA indices
We now discuss the range of possible relative dynamic risk aversion indices. The
choice of the range is important for modeling investors’ decision-making; it has big
impact on the price dynamics, as it directly affects investors’ demand of the risky
asset. The lower the index, the less risk-averse the investor is (thus the higher the
demand of risky asset); and vice versa. Thus the risk-aversion attitude has great
impact on the price dynamics through its influence on the demand. Some empirical
and experimental studies reported that for a “typical” investor, the value of the risk-
aversion index γ is in the range of 0-2 [130, 63, 117]. Mehra and Prescott [130] used a
value of risk aversion index with an upper limit of 10 in their treatment of the issue
of the “Equity Premium Puzzle”. However, to “explain” the “Equity Premium
Puzzle” of NYSE over 50 years of U.S. postwar period, one needs a relative risk
aversion index of 250 if a consumption-based model is used [38]! These empirical
results show that it is better to model the risk aversion with a range of indices,
instead of a fixed index. The range we specified consists of an upper bound and
a lower bound for the random walk describing DRA indices of the heterogeneous
investors.
5.5 The Simulation Results and Analysis
5.5.1 The setup
In our simulation we choose the number of agents, N = 100, the number of predictors
each agent has, M = 2. Setting different number of agents produces similar results.
The initial risk aversion indices γi,0 are all set to 1.0 for the baseline model and are
set to γi,0 ∈ [0.2, 4] for the model with DRA. The bounds for the index of DRA are
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γi,t ∈ [10−5, 20], the risk-free interest rate is r = 5%, the dividend rate is rd = 2%,
and the weighting coefficients for the variance of estimation error is θ = 1/250. The
lags used in the price estimators are Li,j ∈ [2, 250], and we set σp+d=1% for all
agents.
5.5.2 Simulation price and trading volume
Let us first take a look at how excess price fluctuations emerge from a dynamic
risk aversion process. Fig. 5.1 shows the simulation time series of the price and the
trading volume generated from the model with fixed constant risk aversion (CRA)
and the model with dynamic risk aversion (DRA).


















Simulation price time series for different δ (from bottom) = 0, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, and 0.02 
Simulation trading volume time series for different δ =0 (bottom) and = 0.1 (top)
Figure 5.1: The time series of price and trading volume from the models with constant (δ = 0)
and dynamic (δ 6= 0) risk aversion. For the sake of clarity, the time series with different δs were
vertically shifted, e.g., the trading volume for δ =0.01 was upward shifted by 50.
From the figure we see clearly that the DRA leads to increased fluctuations in both
the price and the trading volume. To have a quantitative picture of the impact of
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the DRA on the price, we examine the return distributions below.
5.5.3 Excess volatility
The most widely used measure of price fluctuations is the return distribution. In
Fig. 5.2 we plot the return distribution from our baseline model and the DRA model
with the parameters set according to a normal market condition. For comparison,
we also plot the return distribution of DJIA in different time periods (from one day
to 32 days) and the return distribution generated by a simple Gaussian process.
These plots show that the results from our baseline model are very close to those
of the Gaussian process; in contrast, the results from the DRA model are close to
the real DJIA data. In the context of our model, it is clear that the dynamic risk
aversion leads to excess volatility or a fat-tail in the return distribution, which is
one of the important characteristics of real financial time series [124, 61].
To further examine the fat tail of the distribution, we plot, in Fig. 5.3, the kurtosis
as a function of the variance of risk aversion, δ. From these plots, we see that the risk
aversion dynamics can change the return distribution significantly from a Gaussian
distribution (which has K=3.0). In addition, the smaller the lag τ , the larger the
kurtosis generated; this is consistent with the empirical observations. These values
of the kurtosis, together with the standard deviation and skewness are listed in Table
5.1
Note that the statistics generated from our DRA model are quite close to that from
DJIA daily data.
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Table 5.1: S.D., Skewness and Kurtosis from DRA model (δ=0.01) and DJIA
Lag (τ) S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
Model δ = 0.01
1 0.015004 -0.454483 48.406593
2 0.018313 -0.372956 35.233093
4 0.021685 -0.460952 26.051126
8 0.026179 -0.492277 17.309658
16 0.031840 -0.424137 11.376849
32 0.039121 -0.327192 7.444087
DJIA
1 0.010876 -1.190497 40.2330
2 0.015710 -1.100639 29.9739
4 0.022213 -0.950496 18.9213
8 0.032103 -0.989078 13.6606
16 0.046404 -0.995792 12.0792
32 0.066602 -0.706621 9.5892
5.5.4 Volatility clustering
Volatility clustering is another important characteristics of financial time series.
Here we use the conditional probability measure developed recently by Chen et al.
[35] to examine the volatility clustering. The method uses the return distribution
conditional on the absolute return in the previous period to describe a functional
relation between the variance of the current return and the absolute return in the
previous period. If the volatility in asset returns is clustered, it will be proportional
to the volatility in the previous period, the proportionality constant reflects the
strength of volatility clustering.
Fig. 5.4 shows how the current volatility depends on the volatility of the previous
period for a random walk process, the baseline market model, DRA model, and
DJIA daily data. From the figures we see clearly that the baseline market model
with fixed constant risk aversion (CRA) produces very low volatility clustering (the
curve is flat if there is no volatility clustering, such as the case with the random
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walk model (Gaussian process). In contrast, the volatility clustering from the DRA
model is significantly higher, and it is very close to the one generated from DJIA
daily prices. The plots also show that, for our DRA model, the smaller the time
period (step) of the return, the stronger the volatility clustering; and vice versa.
This is consistent with the empirical observations of real market data.
5.6 The SFI Market Model with Dynamic Risk
Aversion
5.6.1 Brief introduction to SFI market model
To test the impact of DRA on other baseline model, we use the well-known Santa
Fe model of artificial market [6, 115]. We first give a brief review of the SFI market
below. In the SFI market a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function
(U(ct, γ) = −ectγ) is assumed for each agent, the demand and price setting equations
in fact have similar forms as in Eqn. (5.2) and (5.3).
The dividend process is assumed to be an AR(1) process:
dt = d¯+ ρ(dt − d¯) + εt (5.24)
where t is an i.i.d. Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance σe
The SFI market assumes that each of the N (=25) agents at any time possesses M
(=100) linear predictors and uses the one that best matches the current market state
and have recently proved most accurate. Each predictor is a linear regressor of the
previous price and dividend, E(pt+1 + dt+1) = a(pt + dt) + b; it uses a market state
“recognizer” vector consisting of J (=12) elements, each taking a value of either 0,
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1 or #(match any market states). The market status is described by a state vector
consisting of J binary elements, each taking value of either 1 (its specified market
condition exists) or 0 (the market condition does not exist). The elements of mar-
ket state can represent any important market discriminative information, including
macro-/micro- economic environment, summary of fundamentals, and market tem-
poral trends, etc. At each time step, only those predictors which match all their J
elements to the corresponding J elements of market status are eligible to be used
and are called “active” predictors.
The variance of estimation error σ2i,t for each agent is assumed to update with a
moving average of squared forecast error, defined in Eqn. (5.17).
Agents learn to improve their performance by discarding the worst (20%) predictors
and developing new predictors via a genetic algorithm. This ensures the market
some dynamics.
In the SFI model, the market conditions are specified as:
1-6 elements represent “current price × interest rate / dividend” > 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
0.875, 1.0, 1.125.
7-10 elements describe “Current price ” > 5-period moving average of past prices
(5-period MA), 10-period MA, 100-period MA, 500-period MA.
11th element always 1;
12th element always 0;
The regressor’s parameters {a, b} are set to be randomly and uniformly distributed
within the ranges: a ∈ (0.7, 1.2) and b ∈ (−10, 19.002).
The risk-free interest rate is set to 5%, and for the dividend process: the auto-
regression coefficient ρ = 0.95, d¯ = 10, and σe = 0.0745.
The weighting coefficients for the variance of estimation error, θ = 1/75, 1/150 for
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faster and slower learning respectively. The genetic algorithm is invoked (on average)
every Te = 250 periods (faster learning) and 1000 periods (slower learning). For more
detailed justification for choosing these parameter values, see LeBaron et al. [115].
With these setups, we have checked that the simulation stock price time series and
its statistical properties generated are in fact similar to those of our baseline model.
5.6.2 Numerical results of SFI market model with DRA
The dynamics of risk aversion can be similarly incorporated into the SFI market
model. Fig. 5.5 plots the simulation price time series for different DRA variance
δ2. These plots show clearly the impact of price fluctuation due to the DRA. To
have a quantitative picture on how the excess volatility emerges from the DRA, we
plot in Fig. 5.6 the kurtosis vs variable δ. The results are very similar to those
plotted in Fig. 5.3, which were obtained with our much simpler baseline model.
5.7 Conclusion
We have presented a simple multi-agent model of a financial market which incorpo-
rates the dynamics of risk aversions. We assume that the index of DRA follows a
simple independent bounded random walk with a constant variance δ2. We demon-
strate that such dynamics is directly responsible for excess volatility and the associ-
ated volatility clustering. We compare the numerical results from our model with the
results obtained by analyzing the DJIA daily data and show that the simulation data
reproduce most of the “stylized” facts, such as excess volatility (reflected in fat tail
and high peak of return distribution), volatility clustering measured by conditional
return distribution. We have also tested the DRA on the Santa Fe market model
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and obtain similar results. This suggests that the impact of DRA among heteroge-
neous agents we introduced here does not depend on the structure of the particular
baseline model used. The degree of excess volatility is essentially controlled by the
parameter δ. We suggest that δ can be used as a key market sentiment parameter,
in conjunction with the other market indicators such as average return r and the
average volatility σ0, to characterize the financial market. Our results presented
here provide new insights into the dynamics of asset price fluctuations governed by
investors’ fluctuating sentiments.
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τ = 1 day τ = 2 days 
τ = 4 days τ = 8 days 
τ = 16 days τ = 32 days 
Figure 5.2: Return distributions for the model with constant risk aversion (CRA) (δ=0) and the
DRA model (δ=0.01), Gaussian process (Gauss) and real data of DJIA.
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τ = 1 step
τ = 2 steps
τ = 4 steps
τ = 8 steps
τ = 16 steps
τ = 32 steps
Gauss
Figure 5.3: Kurtosis of simulation price series for different variances δ2 of the DRA index.
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τ = 1 day τ = 2 days 
τ = 4 days 
τ = 8 days 
τ = 16 days τ = 32 days 
Figure 5.4: The volatility clustering measured by the standard deviation of current return vs the
absolute return of the previous period.
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Figure 5.5: Simulation price series for different variances of DRA processes. The model parame-
ters are: θ = 1/75, Te = 250. The prices for different δs have been vertically shifted to make the
comparison clearer. From the bottom to top, the price series are respectively for δ = 0, 0.01, 0.02,
0.03, 0.04 and 0.05.












τ = 1 step
τ = 2 steps
τ = 4 steps
τ = 8 steps
τ =16 steps
τ =32 steps
Kurtosis of simulation data generated by dynamical risk aversion model 
Figure 5.6: Kurtosis of simulation price series for different variances of DRA processes, δ2.
The model parameters are: θ = 1/75, Te = 250. The data were obtained by averaging over 50
independent runs.
Chapter 6
Modeling the Market with Evolutionary
Minority Game
In this chapter we study general statistical properties of the financial market as
a game of interacting and competing agents. Here we are considering the generic
behaviors of agents in a prototypical agent based model — minority game (MG),
and study the mechanism for such behaviors with possible interpretation in the
context of financial markets (market impact and market inefficiency). We investi-
gate the impact of evolution on the distribution of agent’s strategy and the phase
structure of the game. The way investors make their decisions may be influenced
by the performance history of their own strategies or by other agents’ strategies.





Economic or financial market is considered one of complex adaptive systems in which
agents adapt to the changes in the global environment, which is induced by the
actions of the agents themselves. The main theme in the study of complex systems
is to understand the emergent properties in the global dynamics. Recently there have
been growing interests in studying financial market as a game of competing agents,
e.g., minority game introduced by Challet and Zhang [30, 31] (see e.g. a collection of
publications at: http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/). In the context of demand and
supply in economic systems, the idea of the minority game is particularly relevant.
If the demand is larger than the supply, the price of the goods will increase; this
benefits the sellers who are in the minority. Many agent based models of economic
systems and financial markets indeed incorporate the essence of the minority game.
The MG model is very useful for gaining understanding of general features of the
financial market.
One of the particular interests is the system in which the agents have no direct
interaction but compete to be in the minority; they modify their behaviors (strate-
gies) based on the past experiences. Challet and Zhang initiated a study in their
original MG model [30, 31] and have shown that there is a phase transition of σ2/N
in the N  2M region; where σ2 is the variance of number of winning agents each
step, N the total number of agents, and M is the memory size of agents. An im-
portant question in the study of the agent-based models is how evolution changes
the behaviors of the agents whose adaptive strategies are based upon history of the
market. In the context of a simple evolutionary minority game (EMG) where agents
use probabilistic strategies based on trends, Johnson et al. found that the agents
universally self-segregate into two opposing extreme groups [93]. Hod and Nakar,
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on the other hand, claimed that a clustering of cautious agents emerges in a “tough
environment” where the penalty for losing is greater than the reward for winning
[86, 134]. To have a complete understanding of the mechanism for the transition
from segregation to herding, we give a detailed statistical mechanical analysis of
the EMG by exploring the whole phase space relating to the parameter N , R, and
d; where R is the reward-to-fine ratio for winning and losing, and d(< 0) is the
“bankruptcy” threshold. From the study we discover the general mechanism for the
transition from self-segregation (into opposing groups) to clustering (towards cau-
tious behaviors) in EMG. Our results can be summarized by the general expression





, where A is a constant of order one. Alter-
natively one might view the transition by varying d with fixed N and R. As |d|
increases the system changes from clustering to self-segregation. The critical value
is then given by |dc| = A(1−R)
√
N . Large market impact favors “extreme” players
who choose fixed strategies, while large market inefficiency favors cautious players.
The phase transition depends on the number of agents (N), the reward-to-fine ratio
(R), as well as the wealth reduction threshold (d) for switching strategy. When
the rate for switching strategy is large, there is strong clustering of cautious agents.
On the other hand, when N is small, the market impact becomes large, and the
extreme behavior is favored. This gives a general and complete picture on the phase
transition of population distribution of agents’ strategy in EMG.
In the above study of the population distribution, the strategy of each agent is
specified with a probability p to follow the trend. We can also use the strategies as
are specified in the original MG of Challet and Zhang [30, 31]. All agents have the
same memory size of M to remember the outcomes from the most recent winning
bits of 0 and 1 of length M . Each strategy is an 2M -bit string of 0 and 1 to match
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the 2M ordered sequence of all possible winning records of length M . Each agent
randomly chooses S strategies from the 2M
M
strategies available, and once chosen,
their strategies remain unchanged. The agents use their strategies adaptively: at
each step, apply the one that performs the best at the time. To apply evolution in
such a model, each agent is asked to evolve individually (to replace his strategies
with new ones selected, at random, from all the available strategies) whenever his
wealth reaches the specified bankruptcy level1. We show that such simple evolution-
ary scheme can result in a radical change of the phase structure of MG. We show
that evolution greatly suppresses herding behavior, and it leads to better overall
performance of the agents. The curve of σ2/N as a function of 2M/N can be char-
acterized by a universal curve with a very different phase structure from the phase
structure of the MG without evolution. The key difference of the phase structures
between the EMG and the MG can be summarized as: 1) in EMG the system per-
formance is dramatically better than that of MG due to the effect of the evolution;
2) the evolution is especially effective for the cases where the system memory sizes
are small; and 3) the impact of evolution decreases as the system memory size, M ,
increases and the performance of the EMG approaches that of the MG for large
values of M . We also suggest a Crowd-Anticrowd theory [92] for understanding the
effect of evolution in the MG.
Another core issue in studying agent-based system is how well the statistical
properties of MG/EMG change when agent-agent interaction is incorporated. Such
a study can be done with a network-based MG in which agents base their adap-
tive strategies on the strategies of other agents, instead of the global history of
1This scheme of evolution is much more efficient than that was used in the previous works [118]
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the game[169]. The aim is to gain better understanding of the impact of differ-
ent network structure on the market efficiency and of the resulting phase structure
of the MG. We investigate the dynamics of network-based MG on three generic
networks: Kauffman’s NK networks (Kauffman nets) [98, 99], growing directed net-
works (GDNets), and growing directed networks with a small fraction of link re-
versals (GDRNets) [170]. We show that the dynamics and the associated phase
structure of the game depend crucially on the structure of the underlying network.
The dynamics on GDNets is very stable for all values of the connection number
K, in contrast to the dynamics on Kauffman’s NK networks, which becomes chaotic
when K > Kc = 2. The dynamics of GDRNets, on the other hand, exhibits
behaviors that are as between GDNets and Kaufman nets, particularly for large
K. For Kauffman nets with K > 3, the evolutionary scheme has no effect on the
dynamics (it remains chaotic) and the performance of the MG resembles that of a
random choice game (RCG).
The next section gives a detailed description of phase transition associated with
changes of population distribution of investors in EMG where agents use proba-
bilistic strategies based on trends. Section 6.3 discusses the dynamics and phase
structure of EMG where agents’ strategies are adaptive but “deterministic”. In sec-
tion 6.4, network based MG with adaptive and “deterministic” strategies is studied
and the effect of evolution is analyzed. The last section concludes.
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6.2 Population Distribution of Agents’ Probabilis-
tic Trend-Based Strategies in EMG
Agent-based models can be used to understand emergent statistical properties of
complex systems. Of particular interests are the systems in which the agents have
no direct interaction but compete to be in the minority; they modify their behaviors
(strategies) based on the past experiences [30, 31]. In this section we shall focus on
the EMG proposed by Johnson, et al. [93] and give a comprehensive study of the
mechanism for the transition of population from segregation to herding in the EMG
by exploring the whole phase space by varying the parameters N , R, and d. We
show the mechanism for the transition from self-segregation to clustering in the EMG






where A is a constant of order one. Large market impact favors “extreme” players
who choose fixed strategies, while large market inefficiency favors cautious players.
The phase transition depends on the number of agents (N), the reward-to-fine ratio
(R), as well as the wealth reduction threshold (d) for switching strategy. This
gives a complete and general picture on the phase transition exhibited in population
distribution of agents’ strategy in the EMG: When the rate for switching strategy
is large, there is strong clustering of cautious agents. On the other hand, when N
is small, the market impact becomes large, and the extreme behavior is favored.
6.2.1 The description of the model
The model is defined as follows. There are N (odd number) agents. At the beginning
of each round they choose to enter Room 0 (sell a stock or choose route A) or Room
1 (buy a stock or choose route B). At the end of each round the agents in the
room with fewer agents (in the minority) win a point; while the agents in the room
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with more agents (in the majority) lose a point. The winning room numbers (0
or 1) are recorded in sequence, and they form a historical record of the game. All
agents share the common memory containing the outcomes from the most recent
occurrences of all 2M possible bit strings of length M . The basic strategy is derived
from the common memory and is changing dynamically. Given the current M−bit
string, the basic strategy is simply to choose the winning room number after the
most recent pattern of same M−bit string in the historical record. To use the basic
strategy is thus to follow the trend.
In the EMG each agent is assigned a probability p: he will adopt the basic strategy
with probability p and adopt the opposite of the basic strategy with probability
1−p. The agents with p = 0 or p = 1, for example, are “extreme” players, while the
agents with p = 1/2 are “cautious” players. The game and its outcomes evolve as
less successful agents attempt to modify their p values. This is achieved by allowing
the agents with the accumulated wealth less than d (d < 0) to change their p values.
In the original EMG model, the new p value is chosen randomly in the interval of
width ∆p centered around its original p value. His wealth is reset to zero and the
game continues. Thus in the EMG the agents constantly learn from mistakes and
adapt their strategies as the game evolves.
A salient feature emerges from the study of the EMG is: the agents self-segregate
into two opposing extreme groups with p ∼ 0 and p ∼ 1 [93, 120, 121]. This
conclusion is rather robust; it does not depend on N , d, ∆p, M , or the initial
distribution of p. The final distribution always has symmetric U-shape. This leads
to the following conclusion: in order to succeed in a competitive society the agent
must take extreme positions (either always follows a basic strategy or goes against
it). This behavior can be explained by the market impact of the agents’ own actions
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which largely penalizes the cautious agents [121]. By introducing the reward-to-
fine ratio R, Hod and Nakar found that the above conclusion is only robust when
R ≥ 1. When R < 1 there is a tendency to cluster towards cautious behaviors and
the distribution of the p value, P (p), may evolve to an inverted-U shape with the
peak at the middle. In some ranges of the parameters M-shape distributions are also
observed. To explain the clustering of cautious agents, Hod gives a phenomenological
theory relating the accumulated wealth reduction to a random walk with time-
dependent oscillating probabilities [87]. However, the dynamical mechanism for the
phase transition is not clear. Here we aim to present such mechanism from the
analysis based on statistical mechanics.
6.2.2 Numerical results of phase transition in population
distribution in EMG
We first present our numerical results which show that the transition from self-
segregation to clustering is generic for R < 1. We have performed extensive sim-
ulations of EMG for a wide range of the values of the parameters, N,R, and d.
The transition depends on all three parameters, N , R, and d. Fig. 6.1 shows the
distribution P (p) for R = 0.971, d = −4, and N=101, 735, 1467, 2935, 5869 and
10001. For a given R (< 1) and d, we observe the transition from self-segregation
to clustering as the number of agents N increases. The shape of the distribution
P (p) changes from a U-shape to an inverted U shape (near the transition point
P (p) has M-shape). The standard deviation σp of the distribution decreases as N
increases. We define the critical value Nc as the value of N when σp equal to the




equal to 1/12. Our results can be summarized by the general expression for the
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Figure 6.1: The distribution P(p) for R=0.971 and d = −4. A set of values of N = 101, 735,
1467, 2935, 5869, and 10001 are used. The distribution is obtained by averaging over 100,000 time
steps and 10 independent runs





, where A is a constant of order one. Alternatively one
might view the transition by varying d with fixed N and R. As |d| increases the
system changes from clustering to self-segregation. The critical value is then given
by |dc| = A(1 − R)
√
N . Fig. 6.2 plots Nc vs |d| for various R. When R → 1 the
clustering only occurs for very large N or very small |d|. At R = 1 the clustering
disappears and the behavior of self-segregation becomes robust.
Hod and Nakar explain that R < 1 corresponds to difficult situations (tough
environments) in which the agents tend to be confused and indecisive and thus
become cautious. We find that the rate of strategy switching (which depends on
both R and d) affect the distribution of the agents more directly. For R < 1 the
agent switches its strategy every 2|d|/(1−R) time steps on average. So when R or
|d| is small, the agents have less patience and switch their strategies more frequently;
this, as we explain below, causes large market inefficiency and thus favors cautious
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Figure 6.2: The critical value |dc| vs N for R = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.94, and 0.975.
agents. It is the rapid adaptation that makes the agents “confused” and “indecisive”.
On the other hand, when the number of agents is small, the market impact becomes
large. Take for example a population consists of only three agents with p = 0, 1/2,
and 1 respectively. The cautious agent (with p = 1/2) always loses because he is
always in the majority, while the extreme agents are in the majority half of the
times. In this case the cautious agent experiences the full market impact of his own
action. Indeed our data show that when N is small enough the self-segregation into
extreme behaviors dominates.
6.2.3 Adiabatic theory for the population distribution in
EMG
We now show that the mechanism for clustering around p = 1/2 and the transition
to self-segregation can be understood from a simplified model in which p takes only
three possible values p = 0, 1/2, and 1. The agents in Group 0 (with p = 0) makes
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the opposite decision from the agents in Group 1 (with p = 1). We denotes the group
with p = 1/2 “Group m”. The probability of winning only depends on N0, Nm, N1,
which are the respective numbers of agents in Group 0, m, and 1.
We begin by evaluating the average wealth reduction for the agents in each of the
three groups. Let n be the number of agents in Group m making the same decision
(let us call it decision A) as those in Group 0 (Nm − n will then be the number
of agents in Group m making the same decision (decision B) as those in Group
1). If N0 + n < (Nm − n) + N1, or n < Nm/2 + (N1 − N0)/2, the agents making
decision A will win; when n > Nm/2 + (N1 − N0)/2, the agents making decision B
will win. The winner has its wealth increased by R, while the loser has its wealth
reduced by 1. With N0, Nm, and N1 fixed, the probability of winning depends
on n. When Nm  1, the distribution of n can be approximated by a Gaussian
distribution P (n) = 1√
2piσm
exp(−(n −Nm/2)2/(2σ2m)), where σm =
√
Nm/2. Given






























Similarly we can derive the average wealth change for the agents in Group 1,












Since the number N0 and N1 are fluctuating, and on the average N0 and N1 should
be the same, we can average out the short time fluctuations in Nd. This allows us to
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find out how the agents in the “extreme” groups compare with the cautious agents
in Group m in the long run. The average wealth change of the agents in Group 0
and 1 is given by ∆we = (N0∆w0+N1∆w1)/(N0+N1). Substituting the expressions
for ∆w0 and ∆w1, we have














Note that the second term in ∆we, which is due to the fluctuations in Nd, is always
negative (since erf(x) is an odd function). When N0 6= N1, the winning probabilities
for making decision A and decision B are not equal, and the market is not efficient.
Thus this term can be interpreted as the cost due to market inefficiency. Large
market inefficiency on average penalize the players taking “extreme” positions more.
For the agents in Group m, if n < Nm/2 + Nd/2, then n agents in the group win,
while Nm − n agents in the group lose. On the other hand, if n > Nm/2 + Nd/2,
then Nm− n agents in the group win, but n agents lose. We need to take these two










(R(Nm − n)− n)P (n)dn
]
.
After a few algebraic steps, we arrive at
∆wm = −(1− R)/2− 1 +R√
2piNm
exp(−N2d /(2Nm)) (6.4)
The first term in ∆m is the same as the first term in ∆e. The second term can be
interpreted as the market impact [121]. The magnitude of the term is in fact the
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largest when Nd = 0. Large market impact (self-interaction) penalizes the cautious
players; their own decisions increase their chances of being in the majority and hence
their chances of losing.
To determine the transition from clustering to self-segregation, we need to calculate
the distribution of Nd which allows us to evaluate ∆we and ∆wm. Let us denote the
change in Nd in one time step as δN . On average δN = 2N0/(|d|/((1− R)/2)) =
N0(1−R)/|d|; this is the average number of extreme agents switching their strategies
per time step (adaptation rate). The factor 2 is included because the agent only
loses about half of the times. |d|/((1− R)/2) is the average time step taken before
the wealth threshold is reached. The dynamics of Nd can be described as a random
walk with mean reversal (there is a higher probability moving towards Nd = 0).
The individual step of the walk is given by ±δN . The probability for changing from
Nd to Nd + δN is given by W+(Nd), and the probability for changing to Nd − δN
is given by W−, where W± = 12 [1∓ erf(Nd/(2
√
2σm)]. The steady state probability
distribution Q(Nd) for Nd should satisfy
Q(Nd) = W−(Nd + δN)Q(Nd + δN)
+W+(Nd − δN))Q(Nd − δN). (6.5)
For small δN one can convert the above equation to a differential equation. The
solution of Q(Nd) is given by










Now we average ∆we and ∆wm over the distribution of Q(Nd). We can easily obtain
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∆wm, on the other hand, is given by
∆wm = −(1−R)/2− 1 +R√
2piNm
< exp(−N2d /(2Nm)) >,
where the average is over the distribution Q(Nd). This can be approximated as









since in the range Nd < σm, where the main contribution to the average comes
from, Q(Nd) can be well approximated by a Gaussian distribution centered at zero





σmδN . At the critical point, N0 = N1 = Nm = N/3,
and ∆we = ∆wm. It is easy to verify that this occurs when δN ∼
√
Nm. As
δN = N0(1−R)/|d|, the crossover value for |d| is |dc| = A0(1−R)
√
N , where A0 is
a constant of the order one.
In the above derivation we simply use the averaged value for δN . This under-
estimates the magnitude of ∆we. For R close to 1, the strategy switching in the
“extreme” group is rather intermittent. There are no agents switching strategy for
many time steps, but in a single step many agents in the group switch strategies. A
loss at a single round, for example, will not make the agents in the extreme group
to switch strategy if they had won in the previous two rounds. We can take this
intermittency into account, by introducing the probability z that strategy switching
occurs in the extreme group after it loses. We leave out the case δN = 0, since it
does not affect the distribution of Nd. The average δN is now N0(1 − R)/(z|d|).
The crossover value for d is then given by |dc| = (A0/z)(1−R)
√
N ≡ A(1−R)√N .
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If δN is close to its averaged value and z ∼ 1, A is of the order one. The broader
the distribution of δN and the larger the intermittency in strategy switching among
the agents in the extreme groups, the larger the value of A. One can estimate the
upper bound for A as follows. The probability z and δN are related to the wealth
distribution of the agents in the extreme groups. The minimum width of the wealth
distribution is |d|, so δN < N/|d|. The upper bound in dc is thus obtained with
δN = N/d and z = 1− R; this leads to dc ∼
√
N , or A ∼ 1/(1− R).
The theory can be generalized to the original EMG model by generalizing the
definition of Nd to Nd = 2(p¯−1/2), where p¯ is the average of the p values among all
the agents at a given time step. The market inefficiency is again measured by the
fluctuation in Nd. Consider the version in which the agent choose a new p randomly
when its wealth is below d, then we can argue that δN (the average change in Nd) is
again given by δN ∼ N(1−R)/|d|. So we have |dc| = A0(1−R)
√
N ; this works well
because the fluctuation of δN is likely to be much smaller in the original model than
in the three-group model. We can also understand the version of the model in which
the new p value is chosen in the interval of width δp around the old p value. Since a
smaller δp leads to a smaller δN , the cost due to market inefficiency is reduced. This
favors the “extreme” agents (|dc| is smaller for a smaller δp); it is consistent with the
results obtained in Ref. [26]. Ref. [87] found that the periodic boundary condition
used in the redistribution of the p value favors clustering. This is also not surprising.
When the boundary condition is periodic in p, δN is effectively increased, because
some p = 0 agents can switch to p = 1 agents, even when δp is small.
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6.2.4 Summary
In summary, we have derived a general formalism for studying the transition from
clustering to self-segregation based on the statistical mechanics of a simplified three-
group model. We find that frequent strategy switching leads to market inefficiency
which favors the clustering of cautious agents. A general expression relating the
number of agents, the wealth threshold, and the reward-to-fine ratio at the critical
point is derived. This expression is found to be equally valid for the general EMG.
6.3 Dynamics and Phase Structure of EMG with
Adaptive and Deterministic Strategies
The MG of Challet and Zhang [30], captures some essential features of complex
adaptive systems in which agents with limited information and rationality compete
for limited resources. A key question in the study of agent-based models is, how
evolution changes the behavior of the agents. There have been a few studies on
the effect of evolution in the minority game. In the context of a simple EMG with
probabilistic trend-based strategy, Johnson et al. found that the agents universally
self-segregate into two opposing extreme groups [93]. Hod and Nakar, on the other
hand, claimed that clustering of cautious agents emerges in a “tough environment”
where the penalty for losing is greater than the reward for winning [86]. Chen et al.
[33, 34] derived a general formalism to understand the dynamical mechanism for the
transition from segregation to clustering. They found that the effective rate of evo-
lution plays an important role in determining the resulting steady-state population
distribution. These studies have focused mainly on population distribution in EMG
with probabilistic trend-folloing strategies. Li et al. [118] studied how evolution
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can help to improve the overall performance of the agents in the original MG with
adaptive (and “deterministic”) strategies. Starting from the original adaptive MG
of Challet and Zhang [30], Li et al. introduced an evolutionary scheme in which all
poorly performing agents evolve synchronously at every τ = 10, 000 steps. Agents
are ranked by their gains, and those ranked at the bottom p percent (p=10%, 20%,
30%, 40%, etc) are forced to change their strategies at these pre-specified steps.
In order to make the evolution process smooth, not all the p percent of the agents
ranked at the bottom will change their strategies, but only 50% of those (chosen ran-
domly) have to do so. Those who are chosen to evolve replace the current strategies
with new ones randomly picked. They reported that with evolution the performance
is significantly better; but the phase structure, characterized by the so-called Savit
curve [145], remains similar to that of the original non-evolutionary MG. A later
study [167] based on a variant of the evolutionary scheme used in Ref. [118] led to
a similar conclusion, but with better overall performance of the agents.
When dealing with models of heterogeneous agent population, it makes sense to
use an evolutionary scheme in which agents evolve individually, instead of synchro-
nously at specified times. In this section we adopt the simple evolution scheme used
in the EMG [93], in which an agent becomes bankrupted and is replaced whenever
its accumulated wealth is below a given threshold. The strategies are adaptive ones
as used in the original MG of Challet and Zhang [30] With this simple scheme we
found that herding behavior has disappeared when the memory length (M) is small,
and the Savit curve obtained is significantly different from that of the original MG.
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6.3.1 The model
The game concerns a population of N (odd number) heterogeneous agents with
limited capabilities, who repeatedly compete to be in the minority group. Each agent
holds S strategies. Each strategy is a look-up table listing the strategy’s prediction
of the minority group given the record of the most recentM minority groups. There
are total 22
M
number of possible strategies, so the larger the value of M , the greater
the processing power of the agents. After each round the winners gain a point and
the losers lose a point. Virtual points are accumulated for each of the strategies the
agent has, and he uses the most successful strategy he possesses. To include the
effect of evolution we assign wealth w to each agent; w will increase/decrease by
one when the agent wins/loses. The agent will be replaced if his wealth is below
a threshold −d (d > 0); the new agent chooses his S strategies randomly and his
wealth is initialized to zero. The distribution of strategies gradually evolves as the
game goes on.
6.3.2 Numerical results
We have done extensive simulations with N = 51, 101, 201, 401; M = 1, 2, · · · , 10;
S = 1, 2; and d = 4, 16, 64, 256, 1024, 4096. The number of time steps used is set to
be T0 = 800000× 2M/2 + 10000d; we have checked that this choice of the time step
is sufficient for obtaining steady-state properties of the model. In our simulations
we monitor σ, which is the standard deviation of the number of agents belonging
to one of the groups. The smaller the value of σ, the larger a typical minority
group and the better the overall performance of the agents will be. The smallest
value of σ is σ = 0.5, which means that the difference between the numbers in the
minority and majority groups is one. The overall performance of the agents is at the
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Figure 6.3: σ2/N vs 2M/N for the MG with and without evolution. d = 256 is used for the
EMG. The results are obtained by averaging over eight independent runs
optimal when σ = 0.5. At the other extreme, when the agents make their choices
randomly as in the random choice game (RCG), we have σ2/N = 0.25. In almost
all our simulations, particularly for small M , evolution reduces σ significantly. This
is illustrated in Fig. 6.3, which shows σ2/N vs 2M/N for the MG with and without
evolution. The results are based on averages over eight independent runs, which are
enough for obtaining accurate averages for the evolutionary MG, as the differences
among different runs are quite small. For small M evolution leads to a dramatic
reduction in σ as herding behavior of the agents is greatly suppressed. The results
for different N fall to a universal curve. For large M the game still approaches the
limit corresponding to the random choice game and the effect of evolution is small.
We have also studied the EMG with the award-to-fine ratio (as defined in Ref. [86])
R 6= 1. In this case the winners get R points while the losers lose a point. We found
that, for each N , there is an optimal value of R = Rc(N) > 1 that gives rise to the
smallest value of σ. For R > Rc(N) the average wealth is ever increasing and there
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Figure 6.4: σ2/N vs 2M/N for the evolutionary MG. d = 64 is used. The results are obtained
by averaging over eight independent runs
is no steady state. Fig. 6.4 shows σ2/N vs 2M/N for R > 1 as compared to the
case R = 1. It is clear from the figure that σ can be further reduced when R > 1.
We also found that, for M = 1 or 2, even the optimal value of σ = 0.5 can in fact
be achieved!
6.3.3 A Crowd-Anticrowd theory for the evolutionary MG
We now consider a Crowd-Anticrowd theory [92] to discuss the effect of evolution
in the minority game. For simplicity we only consider S = 1 and use a reduced
strategy space (RSS). Numerically the differences between the cases with S = 1 and
S = 2 are small. RSS is a subset of strategies, which span the full strategy space
(FSS). Consider, for example, an RSS for M = 2, consisting of the following eight
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strategies:
U ≡ {−1− 1− 1− 1}, {+1 + 1− 1− 1}, {+1− 1 + 1− 1}, {−1 + 1 + 1− 1}
U¯ ≡ {+1 + 1 + 1 + 1}, {−1− 1 + 1 + 1}, {−1 + 1− 1 + 1}, {+1− 1− 1 + 1} (6.8)
Here ±1 indicate the prediction of a strategy given one of the four possible histories.
Any two strategies in {U , U¯} are either uncorrelated (with the Hamming distance
2M/2) or anti-correlated (with the largest Hamming distance 2M). For a given M
there are total 2P (P = 2M) strategies with P pairs of anti-correlated strategies
(other pairs are uncorrelated) in RSS. For each strategy G in RSS there is a corre-
sponding anti-correlated strategy G¯. It is believed that the essential features of the
game are kept when RSS is used instead of the FSS [31].
Let us evaluate σ2 =< (n+(t) − N/2)2 >t=< (n+(t) − n−(t))2 > /4, where n+
and n− are the numbers of agents making the choices +1 and −1 respectively. The







where µ(t) denotes the current history, a
µ(t)
G = ±1 is the response of strategy G to











G′ nG′ >t . (6.9)
In our simulation we found that the system visits all possible histories equally. This
is illustrated in Fig. 6.5, which shows a histogram of the number of visits for each
m-bit history. In order to compare with the non-evolutionary MG, we use S = 2
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N=101,m=6, S=2 (no evolution)
N=101,m=6,S=2 (with evolution)
Figure 6.5: Histogram for the number of appearances of all possible histories. N = 101, S = 2,
M = 6, and d = 256. For comparison the corresponding histogram for the non-evolutionary MG
is also plotted
in the figure; the result for S = 1 is essentially the same. As we can see from the
figure, the system does not visit all possible histories equally in the non-evolutionary
MG. For the EMG we can thus replace an average over time by an average over all
possible histories. Now the double sum can be broken down into three parts, based
on the correlation between the strategies. Given < aGaG >t= 1, < aGaG¯ >t= −1,
and < aGaG′ >t≈< aGaG′ >h= 0 (forG′ 6= G and G′ 6= G¯), where < · · · >h indicates



























< (nG − nG¯)2 >t (6.12)
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In the above derivation we have tacitly assumed that {nG} change very slowly so
the averages over {aG} can be done while holding {nG} constant. This is in the
spirit of adiabatic approximation; it is valid because the evolution rate is low (as
long as d is not too small).
Let nP be the number of pairs of agents holding anti-correlated strategies and
nS be the number of agents holding unpaired strategies. Only the agents holding
unpaired strategies contribute to σ; the game behaves essentially as an RCG with
nS number of agents. Thus we have σ
2 = 0.25nS, or
σ2/N = 0.25s, (6.13)
where s = nS/N . Note that 2nP + nS = N , nP can be written as nP = N(1− s)/2.
To determine s we need to consider the evolutionary dynamics of the game. At the
steady state we have the following balance equation
2rPnP (1− p(m,N)) = rSnSp(m,N), (6.14)
where rP and rS are the bankruptcy rate for the paired agents (pair breaking rate)
and the bankruptcy rate for the unpaired agents respectively; p(m,N) is the prob-
ability that a new pair is formed when a bankrupted agent is replaced. One can
estimate p(m,N) as
p(m,N) = 1− (1− 1/2P )nS ≈ 1− exp(−0.5Ns/2m) (6.15)
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It is somewhat difficult to estimate rP and rS. It can be argued that rP/rS does not
sensitively depend on M and N . The equation for s is then
rP
rS
(1− s) = s p(s/z)
1− p(s/z) , (6.16)
where z = 2M/N . The solution s is a function of z. Thus, when we plot σ2/N
vs z = 2M/N , the curves fall to a universal curve. Since p(x) is a monotonically
decreasing function of x, the universal curve s(z) obtained from the above equation
will be a monotonically increasing function of z. In the limit z → ∞ we have
p(s/z) → 0; this leads to s → 1 or σ2/N = 0.25. Thus z → ∞ is the RCG limit.
For R > 1, rP/rS decreases; this leads to smaller values for s and σ. All these are in
agreement with the simulation results. Thus the Crowd-Anticrowd picture provides
a qualitative understanding of the evolutionary MG.
6.3.4 Summary
We have shown that a simple evolutionary scheme, when applied to a heterogeneous
population of agents, can have radical impact on system dynamics of MG. The key
observations can be summarized as:
• Evolution greatly suppresses herding behavior and therefore results in sub-
stantially better performance in general;
• The curve of σ2/N as a function of 2M/N can be characterized by a universal
curve but with a very different phase structure from the one found in the early
study of EMG [118, 167], especially in the region where the memory sizes of
agents are small; this suggests that evolution is particularly effective for an
information-deficient system.
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• the impact of evolution decreases as the system memory size,M , increases and
the performance of EMG approaches that of MG for the cases where when M
is large (corresponding to an information-redundant system)
• We demonstrated that a Crowd-Anticrowd theory can be used to understand
qualitatively the effect of evolution in the MG.
These observations may give us a better understanding on the effect of evolution in
a game of competing agents.
6.4 Network Based Evolutionary Minority Game
In this section we investigate the dynamics of network minority games on three
generic networks: Kauffman’s NK networks (Kauffman nets), growing directed net-
works (GDNets), and growing directed networks with a small fraction of link rever-
sals (GDRNets). We show that the dynamics and the associated phase structure
of the game depend crucially on the structure of the underlying network. The dy-
namics on GDNets is very stable for all values of the connection number K, in
contrast to the dynamics on Kauffman’s NK networks, which becomes chaotic when
K > Kc = 2. The dynamics of GDRNets, on the other hand, exhibits behaviors
that are as between GDNets and Kaufman nets, particularly for large K. For
Kauffman nets with K > 3, the evolutionary scheme has no effect on the dynamics
(it remains chaotic) and the performance of the MG resembles that of a random
choice game (RCG).
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6.4.1 Introduction
Complex networks have attracted immense interest in recent years, due to their great
capability and flexibility in describing a wide range of natural and social systems.
The study of the organization of complex networks has attracted intensive research
interest [1, 136, 49, 108, 109, 110] ever since the seminal works of Strogatz on small-
world networks [157] and Baraba´si and Albert [11] on scale-free networks. The
power law or scale-free degree distributions have been established in many real-
world complex networks [157, 11, 70]. The dynamics of a complex network can be
studied in the context of a system of interactive elements (agents) on the network;
it depends on how the network is organized and how the elements interact. Here we
study a network version of the minority game (MG) model proposed by Challet and
Zhang [30], which is a simplification of Arthur’s El Farol bar attendance model [5].
The MG model serves as an interesting paradigm for a system of adaptive agents
competing for limited resources. The phase structures of the original MG [145] and
the evolutionary version of the game [93, 86, 33, 168] have been well understood.
Note that in the MG models, the agents are not directly linked to one another, but
they are influenced by the global environment created by the collective action of all
the agents.
The study of network dynamics is pioneered by Kauffman [98, 99] who introduced
NK random networks and studied its Boolean dynamics. Recently there are quite
a number of studies on different aspects of network dynamics. Aldana and Cluzel
demonstrated that the scale-free network favors robust dynamics [2]. Paczuski et
al. [137] considered the MG model on a random network to study the self-organized
process which leads to a stationary but intermittent state. Galstyan [71] studied a
network MG, focusing on how the change of the mean connectivity K of a random
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network affects the global coordination of the system of different capacities. Anghel
et al. [3] used the MG model to investigate how interagent’s communications across a
network lead to a formation of an influence network. Here we address the question of
how different network organizations affect the dynamics of the system in the context
of the network MG. In particular we would like to know 1) how the dynamics and
phase structure of the network minority game depend on the network organization,
and 2) how evolution affects the dynamics and phase structure of the game. We will
consider three types of rather generic networks: Kauffman’s NK random networks
(Kauffman nets) [99], growing directed networks (GDNets), and growing directed
networks with a fraction of link reversals (GDRNets) as described in Ref. [170].
6.4.2 Description of network EMG model
The network minority game model is defined in a similar way as the original MG
model [30], except for the input for the strategy of an agent (node). In the original
MG, the input for each agent’s strategies at time t is a vector of the winning decisions
of the game in the previous M time steps. In the network (local) MG, however, the
input for each agent’s strategies at time t is a vector consisting of the decisions of the
K agents she connects to at the previous time step t− 1. Specifically. The network
based MG model consists of N (odd number) agents described by the state variables
si = {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , each connected to another K agents, i1, i2, · · · , iK .
Each agent has S strategies which are the mapping functions specifying a binary
output state (0 or 1) for each possible input vector consisting of the states of her K
connected agents. The state or decision of the ith agent at the current time step t
is determined by the states/decisions of the K agents it connects to at the previous
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time step t− 1, i.e.
si(t) = F
j
i (si1(t− 1), si2(t− 1), ..., siK(t− 1)) (6.17)
where sik(k = 1, 2, ..., K) is the state of the kth agent that is connected to agent
i, and F ji , j = 1, .., S are S Boolean functions (strategies) taken from the strategy
space consisting of 22
K
strategies. As in the standard minority game, each agent
keeps a record of the cumulative wealth Wi(t) as well as the cumulative (pseudo)
scores, Qsi (t), i = 1, 2, ..., N, s = 1, 2, .., S, for each of her S strategies. Before the
game starts each agent selects at random one of her S strategies, and the cumulative
wealth Wi(t) and strategy scores Q
s
i (t) are initialized to zero. At each time step,
each agent decides which of the two groups (0 or 1) to join based on the best-scoring
strategy (the strategy that would have made the most winning predictions in the
past) among her S strategies. The agent gains (loses) one point in her cumulative
wealth for her winning (losing) decision and each strategy gains (loses) one pseudo-
point for its winning (losing) prediction. The agents who are among the minority
win; those among the majority lose. Let A(t) be the number of agents choosing 1 at
time step t. Then a standard measure of utilization of the limited resources (system











A(t) ∼ N/2 is the mean number of agents choosing 1. Clearly
σ2 measures the global coordination among agents. The optimal (smallest) value of
variance σ2 is 0.25, where the number of winning agents reaches its optimal value,
(N − 1)/2, in every time step. For a random choice game (RCG), where each agent
makes decision by coin-tossing, the value of the variance σ2 is 0.25N . The game is
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adaptive as each agent has S strategies to choose from at each time step, attempting
to increase her chance of winning.
The key difference between the network MG and the original MG is that the
agents in the original MG use global information while the agents in the network
MG use local information. The strategies in the original MG are based on the M
time-step history of global information while the network MG employs a one-step
forward dynamics based on the strategies of other agents at previous time step.
We first investigate the adaptive MG models and used the results as a basis
for comparison with the evolutionary MG model. In an evolutionary dynamics,
the quenched strategies can be changed and more generic behavior emerges. We
use the standard evolutionary dynamics described in Refs. [93, 168], in which each
agent is required to change his S strategies (by choosing S new strategies randomly)
whenever his cumulative wealthWi(t) is below a pre-specified bankruptcy threshold,
−Wc(Wc > 0). The bankrupted agents re-set their wealth and strategy pseudo-
scores to zero, and the game continues. The network connection, however, does not
evolve. We have found that this evolutionary scheme is much more effective than
other scheme used for studying MGs [137], in which the evolution happens at the
end of every epoch of specified duration (say 10, 000 time steps), and only the worst
performer is required to change her strategies after each epoch.
6.4.3 Generation of different networks
The dynamics of the game depends crucially on the network organization. Here we
consider three types of rather generic networks for studying network dynamics with
MG. To study the dynamics, we need to specify input-output relationship among
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the nodes; this naturally leads to a directed network, in which the direction of a
link indicates an input from the node at the other end of the link. The first directed
network we consider is the well-known Kauffman net [99], in which the (K) inputs
to a node are randomly selected. The Kauffman net is thus a random directed net-
work. The second one is a growing directed network, in which the new nodes are
controlled by the old ones, but not vice versa. This is an extreme case. In many
real networks, there is a strong degree of hierarchical dependence; in most cases
the older nodes (the nodes at the higher hierarchy) influence the newer nodes (the
ones at the lower hierarchy). But there bound to be exceptions. This lead to the
third class of networks: a growing directed network with a fraction of link reversals.
Below we describe in details these networks. Note that in our model, the network
connection, once generated, remain fixed.
The Kauffman NK random network (Kauffman net)
The Kauffman net is generated by specifying N agents first, and then connecting
each agent randomly to K other agents [99], whose decisions serve as the input to
its strategies.
Growing directed network (GDNet)
A growing directed network is generated according to the description given in
Ref. [170]. We start with an initial cluster of K + 1 agents, which are mutu-
ally connected (two directed links between each pair of agents). At each stage, we
add a new agent and connect it to K other agents already present in the network.
The link is directed from the new agent to the existing ones, meaning that the
strategies of the new (younger) agent are based on the states of the existing (older)
ones. We assume that the probability of connecting a new agent to an existing one
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with degree kin is proportional to k
α
in+1, where kin is the number of incoming links
from the existing agent. The constant 1 is added to give a nonzero starting weight to
the agents that have not been connected to. For α = 0, we have a growing directed
random network which we refer to as GDNet I. For α > 0, we have preferential
attachment. The special case of α = 1 corresponds to a scale-free directed network
which we refer to as GDNet II. In this network, the out-degree is K for all the
agents, but the in-degree follows a power law distribution. The undirected version
of this model corresponds to the well-known Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [1].
In the growing networks (random or scale-free), the younger agents are influenced
by the older ones, except for the initial K + 1 agents who are mutually influenced.
Growing directed network with a fraction of link reversals (GDRNet)
This network is based on the above growing network, but we introduce a small
fraction of link reversals. Let p be the probability that each agent has a link reversal:
when each new agent is connected to other K agents already present in the network,
each link has a probability of q = p/K to have its direction reversed. We consider
twoGDRNets: GDRNet I with α = 0 andGDRNet II with α = 1. GDRNet is
the general case of a generic class of directed networks. Kauffman’s net andGDNet
are two extreme cases, corresponding to q = 0.5 and q = 0 with respectively. There
are two new features forGDRNets: 1) Some agents may have more thanK strategy
inputs, while others may have fewer than K inputs; but the mean number of inputs
for an agent remains as K. 2) Some younger agents can influence the older agents.
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Figure 6.6: The normalized variance on the number of winning agents, σ2/N as a function of K
in theMG on Kauffman NK random network. Each agent uses S (=2) strategies. The mean
and the S.D. are computed from the 1000 independent runs.
6.4.4 Numerical results and analysis
MG/EMG on the Kauffman net
Let us first examine the performance of MG on the Kauffman net. The result is
shown in Fig. 6.6. It is clear from the figure that when K = 2, the variance σ2
has very large fluctuations (four orders of magnitude for N = 401 and five orders
of magnitude for N = 901); different initial conditions give rise to very different σ2.
This reflects the fact that the system dynamics is critical for K = 2. For K ≥ 3 the
system performs like a random choice game. The observation we obtained here is
consistent with the well-known result for the Boolean dynamics on Kauffman nets:
when K = 2 the system is at the “edge of chaos” and for K ≥ 3 the system is
chaotic [99, 47].
The dynamics in the original MG depends on two variables: N , the system size
and M , the memory size of the agents. There are three different phases for different
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a) N=401 b) N=901 
Figure 6.7: The normalized variance on the number of winning agents, σ2/N as a function of
K in the EMG on Kauffman NK random network. The other settings of parameters and
simulations are the same as used in Fig. 6.6.
memory valueM , described by a Savit curve [145]. The critical value for an optimal
global coordination is Mc ∼ ln(N), which depends on N . For the network MG on
the Kauffman net, however, the three phases of the dynamics are: stable for K = 1,
critical for K = 2, and chaotic for K ≥ 3. The critical value is fixed at Kc = 2,
which does not depend on N . So the dynamics of network MG depends on only one
variable, K, and the chaotic regime dominates.
Now let us check how the game performs when the simple evolution scheme de-
scribed above is applied. The results are shown in Fig. 6.7. We see from the figure
that evolution helps dramatically improve the system performance when the con-
nection number K is small (K ≤ 3), but has virtually no effect for larger K(≥ 4).
This means that for K ≤ 3 the system is at stable or “critical” state, but for K ≥ 4
it is chaotic. Note that evolution has shifted the critical point from K = 2 to K = 3,
suggesting that it is more powerful than adaptation (modeled by strategy switching)
in bring out order in complex systems.
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MG/EMG on Growing Directed Networks
Now we examine the performance of MG on growing directed networks. Two lim-
iting cases of the growing directed networks are checked: 1) GDNet I, the growing
random directed network (α = 0); 2) GDNet II, the growing directed network
with a linear preferential attachment (α = 1). Fig.6.8 shows the results of system
performance. We have the following observations for the MG dynamics: 1) there are
large fluctuations in the values of the variance σ2; 2) there seems to be no significant
difference in the MG dynamics for the two growing network models. So in terms of
a simple (non-evolutionary) dynamical process, all growing networks (irrespective of
its value of preferential attachment exponent α ∈ [0, 1]) have similar dynamics and
the scale-free network (α = 1) is not special. The stability of the dynamics is due
to the construction process of growing networks, which leads to a maximum state
cycle length of 2K+1 as was pointed out in Ref. [170], irrespective of the value of α.
Comparing the dynamics of growing networks with that of the Kauffman net,
however we see a lot of differences. In the Kauffman net (Fig.6.6) the dynamics is
stable or critical for K ≤ 2. In growing networks (Fig.6.8), however, the dynamics is
stable for all the values of K, on both GDNet I and GDNet II. Thus non-growing
and growing networks have dramatically different network dynamics.
To see how evolution affects the dynamics, we plot the results of system perfor-
mance for the EMG on GDNets in Fig.6.9. By comparing Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9,
we see that evolution helps reduce the variance σ2 dramatically (by more than two
orders of magnitude). This suggests that evolution is also very effective in improving
system performance for the network-based MG.
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a) N=401, α=0 b) N=901, α=0 
a) N=401, α=1 b) N=901, α=1 
Figure 6.8: The normalized variance on the number of winning agents, σ2/N as a function of K
in the MG on GDNet I (α = 0, upper panel) and GDNet II (α = 1, bottom panel). The other
settings of parameters and simulations are the same as used in Fig. 6.6.
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a) N=401, α=0 b) N=901, α=0 
a) N=401, α=1 b) N=901, α=1 
Figure 6.9: The normalized variance on the number of winning agents, σ2/N as a function of
K in the EMG on GDNet I (α = 0, upper panel) and GDNet II (α = 1, bottom panel). The
other settings of parameters and simulations are the same as used in Fig. 6.8.
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For growing directed networks with MG, the different preferential attachment (of
α = 0, or α = 1) does not make any noticeable difference (comparing the plots in top
panel and the bottom panel in Fig. 6.8); However with evolution, the preferential
attachment (α = 1) of growing directed networks makes the system closer to the
“critical state”. This can be seen by comparing the dynamic range of the value
σ2/N (especially in the cases where values of K are large) in the plot for GDNet-I
with α = 0 (on top panel of Fig. 6.9) and GDNet-II with α = 1 (on bottom panel
of Fig. 6.9).
MG/EMG on Growing Networks with Link Reversals
Now we examine the performance of the MG/EMG on growing networks with link
reversals, GDRNet I (α = 0) and GDRNet II (α = 1). The results for the MG
are shown in Fig. 6.10 and the results for the EMG are shown in Fig. 6.11. By
comparing the plots in Fig. 6.10-6.11 and in Fig. 6.8-6.9, we can get the following
observations. 1) The dynamics of random growing directed network (GDNet-I) is
not sensitive to the (small fraction of) link reversal; this can be seen by comparing the
results of the MG/EMG onGDNet-I and onGDRNet-I. 2) However the dynamics
of growing directed network with preferential attachment (scale-free network for
α = 1) is sensitive to the (small fraction of) link direction reversal; this can be
seen by comparing the results of the MG/EMG on GDNet-II and on GDRNet-
II. For the scale-free network, the dynamics of the MG/EMG is not sensitive to
their connection number for large K (>3); however this is not true for the scale-free
network with a (small fraction of) link reversal. The reversal of link direction shifts
the dynamics from the critical region to the chaotic region: the lager the connection
number, the more pronounced the effect. This suggests that the random growing
directed network is more resilient to the link direction reversal, while the scale-free
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a) N=401, α=0 b) N=901, α=0 
a) N=401, α=1 b) N=901, α=1 
Figure 6.10: The normalized variance on the number of winning agents, σ2/N as a function of
K in theMG on GDRNet I (α = 0, upper panel) and GDRNet II (α = 1, bottom panel). The
other settings of parameters and simulations are the same as used in Fig. 6.8.
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a) N=401, α=0 b) N=901, α=0 
a) N=401, α=1 b) N=901, α=1 
Figure 6.11: The normalized variance on the number of winning agents, σ2/N as a function of
K in the EMG on GDRNet I (α = 0, upper panel) and GDRNet II (α = 1, bottom panel).
The other settings of parameters and simulations are the same as used in Fig. 6.10.
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directed network is fragile to (even small percentage) link reversal.
6.4.5 Summary
The dynamics of network MGs depend crucially on the organization of the underly-
ing network structures. We have presented an extensive numerical investigation on
the dynamics of the MG on three general classes of networks, and we have found
a few generic dynamical features of the network MG. The dynamics of the network
MG is significantly different from that of the original MG. In the original MG, the
critical value for an optimal global coordination is Mc ∼ ln(N), so the dynamics
depends on two variables: N , the system size andM , the memory size of the agents.
In the network MG, however, the dynamics depends on K only. The MG on the
Kauffman net exhibits three phases: stable for K = 1, critical for K = 2, and
chaotic when K ≥ 3; this is consistent with Kauffman’s Boolean dynamics. We
have studied the dynamics of the EMG on the Kauffman net, and we have found
that, the critical value of K shifts to Kc = 3, different from the critical value Kc = 2
for the non-evolutionary MG. Evolution makes a significant difference.
Besides Kauffman’s net, we have also investigated the dynamics of the MG on a
generic class of growing directed networks. For the extreme case of no link reversal
(GDNet), we show that, the dynamics is stable on these growing networks, and it is
very different from the dynamics on the Kauffman NK random network. This is due
to the way the network is constructed. There is no critical K value, beyond which
the dynamics is chaotic. In the Kauffman net all the agents are treated equally;
every agent has an equal probability to influence others. This results in a very large
“influence network” of a given agent, particularly for large K. However, in growing
directed networks, the initial cluster of agents dictate the dynamics of the system;
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the “junior” agents have no influence on the “senior” ones. Our numerical results
show that the best system coordination and performance emerges for the EMG on
the scale-free network (GDNet II);
We have also studied the MG dynamics on a modified growing directed network
model which allows a small fraction of link reversals. Our numerical results show
that for large numbers of connection, K, the link reversal shifts the dynamics close
the chaotic region, as the network is closer to the Kauffman network, particularly
for large K.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a detailed study on modeling several behavior
of the market with evolutionary minority game (EMG). Three different kinds of
EMGs are investigated: 1) EMG with probabilistic strategies based on trends; 2)
EMG with adaptive and “deterministic” strategies, and 3) EMG with network-based
strategies.
For EMG with probabilistic strategies based on trends, we have conduct intensive
numerical study and derive a theory for the steady-state population distribution of
the agents. The theory is based on an “adiabatic approximation” in which short
time fluctuations in the population distribution are integrated out to obtain an ef-
fective equation governing the steady-state distribution. The general mechanism we
have discovered for the phase transition from segregation (into opposing groups) to
clustering (towards cautious behavior) shows that it is determined by two generic
factors: the market impact (of the agents’ own actions) and the short time market
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inefficiency (arbitrage opportunities) due to fluctuations in the numbers of agents us-
ing opposite strategies. A large market impact favors “extreme” players who choose
fixed opposite strategies, while large market inefficiency favors cautious players. The
transition depends on the number of agents (N) and the effective rate of strategy
switching. When N is small, the market impact is relatively large; this favors the
extreme behaviors. Frequent strategy switching, on the other hand, leads to a clus-
tering of the cautious agents.
For EMG with adaptive and “deterministic” strategies, we show that, when a sim-
ple evolutionary scheme is applied to a heterogeneous population of agents, herding
behavior in the MG is greatly suppressed. The dependence of the standard deviation
σ on the number of agents N and the memory length M can be characterized by
a universal curve, which can be understood qualitatively with a Crowd-Anticrowd
theory.
For network MG/EMG, we investigate the dynamics for three generic networks:
Kauffman’s NK networks (Kauffman nets), growing directed networks (GDNets),
and growing directed networks with a small fraction of link reversals (GDRNets)
and we show that the dynamics and the associated phase structure of the game
depend crucially on the structure of the underlying network. For Kauffman nets, the
dynamics heavily depends on the connection number K: 1) for K=1, the variance
of number of winning agents, σ2 is the highest and the fluctuation of σ2 is small; 2)
For K = 2, σ2 fluctuates wildly (suggesting that it is in a critical state); and 3) for
K ≥ 3, σ2 has very low fluctuations and takes value as of that random choice game
(indicating that it is in the chaotic region). Evolution has dramatic effect on the
dynamics for small connection number (K ≤ 3), but has no effect on the dynamics
(it remains chaotic) for large connection number. The σ2 values for K ≤ 3 are all
6.5 Conclusions 175
far below that of RCG, while for K ≥ 4 they take the same values as of RCG. The
dynamics on GDNets is very stable for all values of the connection number K and
it only weekly depends on the connection number K. Evolution suppresses both
the values of σ2 and its fluctuation dramatically, resulting in far lower values of σ2
which are all below the RCG level. The dynamics of GDRNets, on the other hand,





We present a systematic study of volatility clustering, scaling and dynamics of FTS,
and investigate their underlying mechanism. The main conclusions from our study
are listed below.
1. A conditional probability distribution (CPD), P (r|rp;T ), (defined as a PDF
of the asset return r of the current time interval T , given the return rp in the
previous time interval of the same duration) can be used as a good quantita-
tive measure of volatility clustering. The dependence of the width of CPDs,
w(r|rp;T ), on its previous return, rp, is linear at large returns for real FTS,
which can be expressed as: w(r|rp) = ηrp + w0, where η is a parameter which
gives a direct measure of the strength of volatility clustering. In addition, the
CPDs of different previous returns, when scaled by their respective widths,
collapse to a universal curve exhibiting a power-law tail with an exponent of
−4. This universal feature is valid across different return series of different
markets and for a very wide range of aggregate time intervals of the returns,
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from minutes to a few months. Thus the CPD can be used as effective tool
for characterizing FTS.
2. The GARCH(1,1) model (with normal error) gives lower excess volatility and
incorrect time scale dependence of excess volatility for real FTS with long time
horizon; thus it is not a valid choice when it comes to describing dynamics for
real FTS.
3. We have studied a simple stochastic volatility model (capturing the two essen-
tial facts that returns are uncorrelated but the volatility is clustered in real
FTS), which can explain and reproduce most of the key stylized facts (in-
cluding the universality of CPDs and the volatility clustering on various time
scales) exhibited in real FTS. The three-parameter model possesses desired
parsimony and sufficient flexibility to fit various FTS with different strengths
of volatility clustering in different time scales.
4. We have constructed an agent-based model for investigating the impact of
investors’ sentiment on the dynamics of financial markets, and we found the
dynamic risk aversion (DRA) is the main driving force for the excess volatility
and the associated volatility clustering. Such DRA can be modeled with a
bounded random walk with a variance δ which directly controls the strength
of volatility clustering. It is commonly perceived that the price fluctuations
were mainly driven by the changing price forecasts of investors in response to
news flows process; in contrast, our study shows that the investors’ DRA plays
a more essential role in the dynamics of asset price fluctuations. This sheds
new lights on understanding the origin and the dynamical mechanism for the
emergence of the excess volatility and the associated volatility clustering in
the financial market.
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5. Minority game, as a prototypical agent based model, can be used to study evo-
lution of strategies and generic behaviors of agents; this is helpful for gaining
better understanding of how investor’s behaviors, such as herding, cluster-
ing of strategies, trend-following and segregation influence the dynamics of
financial markets and affect market efficiency. We have discovered the gen-
eral mechanism of phase-transition exhibited in the population distribution
of competing and evolving agents in the evolutionary MG model with sim-
ple probabilistic strategies based on trend. The implication of the mechanism
is that large market impact (when market is efficient) favors self-segregation
behavior (analogous to fundamentalist’s strategy), while large market ineffi-
ciency induces herding behavior (analogous to noise trading). Two key factors
are responsible for market efficiency: the way investors make their decisions
(their strategies are based on either local or global information and their strate-
gies are either probabilistic or adaptive and deterministic), and the way the
markets evolve (static or evolutionary). We have shown that large market
inefficiency caused by agents’ herding behaviors can be greatly reduced by
evolution, and as a result it suppresses the short-lived arbitrage opportunity
and leads to an efficient market in a long run.
7.2 Summary of Contributions
The major contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
1. Developed a market model of heterogeneous agents with dynamical risk aver-
sions (DRA) to explain the excess price fluctuations and volatility clustering;
identified the DRA as a key driving force of price dynamics.
2. Developed a conditional probability measure to quantify volatility clustering in
7.2 Summary of Contributions 179
FTS, an important tool for financial data analysis, and uncovered a universal
feature of FTS: a linear conditional correlation between the volatility of the
current period and that of the previous period.
3. Uncovered both analytically and numerically an important shortcoming on the
GARCH(1,1) model (with a normal error distribution): it gives very different
time scale dependence of excess volatility from that of real FTS. Thus when
it comes to modeling the dynamics in real FTS the GARCH model must be
used with discretion and a better alternative model may be required.
4. Constructed a phenomenological model which is not only able to explain both
the formation of volatility clustering and the emergence of fat power law tails
in the distribution of asset return, but also able to reproduce most of the
“stylized” facts observed in FTS with various sampling frequencies or/and
different strengths of volatility clustering.
5. Discovered and formulated the general mechanism for the transition of agents
from self-segregation to herding behavior in an evolutionary Minority Game
with probabilistic strategies based on trends. This work, quoting from the two
anonymous referees:
. . . deepen our understanding on the fundamental behavior of agents
and the phase-transition characterizing an evolving population.
. . . brings significant new insight into the fundamental behavior of
the EMG model.
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7.3 Future Research
We have made a systematical study of scaling, clustering and dynamics of volatility
in FTS and obtained a good understanding of the underlying mechanism of financial
markets. However, there are many other issues remain untouched in our current
study. The following are particularly relevant to our study and therefore deserve
our future attention:
1. Extend our model to incorporate the asymmetric distribution of returns.
2. Examine how the universal feature of volatility clustering can be applied in
option pricing.
3. Investigate how the price impact of investors’ change of risk aversion affects
the asymmetric distribution of returns.
4. Extend the agent-based model to include alternative investor’s preferences,
such as expected value function proposed in the Prospect Theory and examine
the price impact.
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